The Game Analysis Of Moral Hazard Of China’s Indemnificatory Housing

To fulfill the basic housing needs of low-income families in cities, the governmentintroduced the affordable housing policies to achieve the vision of the Home Ownership.However, there are many problems in China’s affordable housing market. The followingthree moral hazard problems among them are more prominent: inadequate accessmechanism causes some of the families access to affordable housings by violations, theowners of the affordable housings lease illegally, the families protected by thegovernment don’t withdraw timely when the family income increases. Therefore, thispaper mainly analyses the moral hazard problems of the affordable housing by gametheory and provides policy advices to the government.In the theoretical analysis, this paper analyzes the access mechanism of theaffordable housing through the game tree theory in game theory. Afterwards, the causeof the of affordable housing was analyzed and three factors to this was summed up,game analysis is based on these factors, the illegal rental moral hazard problems of theaffordable housing is analyzed through the game theory matrix model, and solving therange of the penalty factor restricting the illegal rental of affordable housing and givingadvices to government policy-making. Finally, exit mechanism of the affordablehousing is analyzed by using the complete information dynamic game model in gametheory, and the exit selection model of affordable housing is proposed in order to get areasonable affordable housing exit incentive range.At the end of this article, concrete proposals are put forward on how to prevent themoral hazard of affordable housing, theoretical basis is provided for the government todevelop incentive plans based on the results of game analysis, and practicalmanagement recommendations are proposed including improving the relevant laws andimplementing dynamic regulatory.