Research On Mechanism Design For The Public Rental Housing Construction Scale And Allocation

Public rental housing is a product used to solve the housing difficulty of sandwich class groups like new employees. Public rental housing is only for rental but not for sale. The implementation of public rental housing mainly involves three stakeholders, i.e. central government, local government and lessee. The central government is mainly responsible for overall planning of public rental housing nationwide; each local government is responsible for specifically implementing construction and distribution of public rental housing; eligible lessees may apply to local government for public rental housing. Among these three stakeholders, local government is the specific executor of public rental housing project. It shall not only appropriate land and funds for construction of public rental housing according to the requirements of the central government but also distribute public rental housing to the lessees who are really in demand. However, since public rental housing is a quasi-public product with the nature of social welfare, the investment of local government in public rental housing seldom generates any profit and even losses are possible. As a result, local government is lack of initiative to construct public rental housing; on the other hand, some “hitchhiker” not complying with application requirements of public rental housing would join the applicants to squeeze public resources. Therefore, it is an essential issue related to smooth implementation of China’s public rental housing as how to motivate local governments’ construction passion during implementation of public rental housing and ensure effective distribution of public rental housing.Currently, the study of public rental housing in China is still in the initial stage. Many research findings are concluded from public rental housing construction and operation management experience of countries and regions like the United States, Germany, Great Britain, Singapore and Hong Kong. The qualitative researches of these countries and regions involving necessity of construction of public rental housing, construction model, financing method, rental distribution method, access mechanism, operation system and exit mechanism have provided many beneficial theoretical explorations for the construction of public rental housing in China in the initial stage. However, researches in this regard rarely adopt mechanism design model and establish identification mechanism to motivate various participants to jointly promote implementation of public rental housing projects.Based on thorough survey of current construction situation of housing guarantee system of China, this paper takes public rental housing as the main research object and applies public gods supply theory, mechanism design theory and rough set evaluation model to conduct profound research on vigorous development of public rental housing in China involving issues like housing supply mechanism design, housing construction design, housing distribution mechanism design and applicant qualification evaluation system so as to realize optimized configuration of public rental housing resources of China, essentially solve the housing guarantee issue of “sandwich class” population of China, and provide scientific decision-making basis for establishment and operation of public rental housing guarantee system in each town of China as well as perfection of policies. The contents of research of this paper mainly include two aspects:① Research on Construction Mechanism of Public Rental HousingThis part includes Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. In Chapter 3, we analyze the game progress about public housing construction scale and transfer pricing between the central government and local government or between local government and developers; thereby manager decides reasonable proportion of public rental housing construction according to China’s regional economic development level. In Chapter 4, evolution game model is employed to study evolution game trends of central government and local governments when central government adopts punishment strategy and subsidy strategy for purpose of motivation, so as to explain the current gradual perfection process of central government when establishing policies related to public rental housing construction.② Research on Distribution Mechanism of Public Rental HousingThis part includes Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. In Chapter 5, influence of change of expected earnings of government and applicants on probability interval of government inspection and applicant disguise has been studied so as to design a screening mechanism to improve fake applicants’ disguising cost, prevent fraudulent behaviors of applicants and ensure sustainable development of public rental housing system. In Chapter 6, data mining theory and rough set theory are applied to establish a weighted evaluation model so as to improve the accuracy of qualification examination of applicants by local governments.Innovations of this paper include:① Different from many researches which mainly discuss qualitative discussion of construction scale of public rental housing from institutional aspect, this paper has established a public rental housing construction game model under two construction models, discussed interest relationships between central government and local governments and between local governments and developers during construction of public rental housing and studied reasonable public rental housing construction scale and pricing mechanism matched with regional economic development level under the precondition of guarantee of reasonable development of regional real estate market from the perspective of national macro-control and self-interests of each region, so as to ensure orderly popularization and implementation of public rental housing system in the whole country.② The condition recognition of applications for public rental housing in existing researches is still in a qualitative exploration stage and the design of punishment mechanism against “hitchhikers” is still not available. This paper mainly applies the theory of “separating equilibrium” in game theory to study influence of design of distribution mechanism by government on interest relationships between governments and applicants and explore a relatively reasonable applicant screening mechanism to promote reasonable distribution of public rental housing.③ Different from existing researches on qualification examination of applicants which only emphasize that applicants should provide comprehensive evidentiary materials as many as possible, this paper employs rough set theory to discuss qualification recognition rules of applicants for public rental housing. On this basis, comprehensive evaluation theory and method are adopted to conduct comprehensive evaluation of eligible public rental housing applicants to determine sequential order of applicants during distribution of housing so as to provide the manager with decision-making support.