Regulation Mechanism Of Industrial Building Use Change

Along with the rapid development of urbanization of Chongqing, the city infrastructure construction level and traffic access degree enhance constantly. The condition of Chongqing industrial park and land price in new north zone significantly improves. Driven by economic interests, some change nature of the industrial land into commercial illegally, moreover directly transfer, sale and rent in order to get huge price difference between industrial and commercial land.This phenomenon not only causes loss of state-owned land assets, but also lead to unfair competition, affect the normal order of land market and social stability. In this paper, we analyze the causes of this phenomenon and its influence based on the survey data. By constructing a dynamic game model of the bid of industrial building and supervision game model, analyze the conflict between land managers and users, finally explore to set up land use change regulation mechanism for Chongqing new north zone, in combination with other domestic provinces and regions of industrial building management experience. The main research contents and conclusions are as follows:(1) For the reference of Chongqing new north zone Industrial land use change control mechanism, we collect the other urban industrial land management measures;(2) Collect and analyze the industrial buildings investigation data and information, find out changed industrial buildings and divide it into four kinds of typical situations according to the change of the subject and method. Caused by the adverse effects include:loss of state-owned land assets, the impact of commercial real estate market, hinder the development of industrial economy of Chongqing new north zone, the existence of the privileged class will also bring bad social influence;(3) The main causes of land use change include:relevant policies and regulations is not sound, land supply structure is unreasonable, large profit space after changing, lack of supervision; (4) Construct industrial building land and land buyers by bidding game model, analyzes the game process in bidding by assuming the land value assessment of industrial land buyer and quotation, calculate the expected return of land buyers and obtain the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Government encourages more land buyer to participate in bidding can fully realize the value of land and get more land revenues, compress the use change profit space, restrict the occurrence of use change from the source;Based on the status in Chongqing new north zone, construct industrial building land managers and the regulation of the land user game model, analyze the conflicts and behavior tendency, discuss the land user’s influence and restriction relationship between gains and losses, finally conclude Nash equilibrium. Land management department can accurately grasp the probability of supervision and control by①reduce cost of supervision and control②increase the penalties③increase incentives to effectively reduce the probability of industrial building use change. On the one hand, it is also an important factor for land managers to develop effective regulation frequency and regulatory range to restrict land use change.(5) Construct land use change control mechanism of industrial buildings in Chongqing new north zone by planning layout, land supplying, development and construction, enterprises, supervision, controlling under the game analysis with related reference to other domestic provinces and cities; Mainly includes:plan the scale of land for industrial use reasonably, adjust industrial building location, transfer industrial building land strictly in accordance with the action to assignment, adjust the industrial land price dynamically, establish a lease transformation system of the industrial building, standardize industrial building assignment contract, clear industry categories in industrial building, limit the price of the building, construct joint supervision mechanism, establish credit files of industrial building land users, strengthen publicity of laws and regulations, improve the participation channel of interest group, set the KPI in the annual evaluation of land management department, combine the key monitoring and routine monitoring, tax should play the role of dynamic adjustment.