Study On Bilateral Learning Model In Construction Dispute Negotiation Based On Zeuthen Strategy

Disputes are considered inevitable in construction projects. It is of greatimportance to study the dynamic offer and counteroffer behaviors in negotiation,which is the preferred settlement of disputes but always conducted inefficiently.This thesis firstly developed a bilateral dispute negotiation agent model on asingle bargaining issue between the Owner and Contractor. Zeuthen strategy wasintroduced to analyze the offer and counteroffer strategy between the two parties inthe alternating-offer bargaining process, and Bayesian learning mechanism wasadopted based on the fact that construction dispute negotiation parties may haveinadequate knowledge about their opponents’ negotiation preference.In the agent-based system，Quadratic function was adopted to simulate the utilitycurve of one party, taking the risk attitude into consideration.“N-M” psychologicaltest combined with function fitting were adopted to determine individual utility in thenegotiation group, then group utility theory was applied to convert the individualutility to group utility. Based on the minimum concession range, Zeuthen strategy wasintroduced in the bargaining phase to analyze when and how to make conssesion. Thisthesis analyzed its two key concepts and application method. Bayesian learningmechanism was introduced to estimate the opponent’s linear utility function andimprove accuracy after every new counteroffer. Considering the deviation betweenthe theoretical unilateral learning model and the practice, it then developed a bilaterallearning model in construction dispute negotiation. The core objective of this modelwas to facilitate construction dispute negotiation among different parties, both theContractor and Owner were empowered the ability to learn according to a dynamicenvironment and adjust the offer through the bargaining process.The implementation of the bilateral learning approach was presented using apractical example, which was given to simulate the dynamic realization of thenegotiation goal and the possible bargaining sequence where both negotiators adoptedthe learning mechanism. Through the practical example, relationship of Zeuthenbargaining solution, reservation amount and the initial offer was analyzed, theconsistence between Zeuthen bargaining solution and two negotiation targets was verified. The results show that the bilateral learning model can help to maximize thealliance utility of the negotiators and make both parties feel satisfied.