Study On Optimization Of The Agency Relationship In State-owned Enterprises

State-owned enterprises are the backbone of our national economy, playing animportant role in the development of the socialist market economy and China’seconomic reform.Because the agency relationship of our state-owned enterprises hasnature characters of more principal-agent levels and uncertain entrust main, theprincipal-agent problem are very prominent. To solve these problems in China’sstate-owned enterprises agency relationship, has a very important theoretical andpractical value for the optimization of state-owned enterprises the agencyrelationship and to achieve the goal of increasing the value of state-owned assets.The research content of this paper is as follows:1. After a whole review of the relevant theory and literature, we present theresearch ideas. Based on the hypothesis of economic man assumption, boundedrationality assumptions and information asymmetry assumptions, this article outlinethe basic theories and research methods, and analyze the widespread agencyrelationship and the basic principal-agent theory ideas comprehensively, and then wesubmit the application ideas of the theories in this article.2Summarize the current situation of state-owned enterprises’ agencyrelationship, and then propose the article’s research questions. Based on the contentand the method of the study on the principal-agent theory, we make analysis of thedifference of agency relationship between state-owned enterprises and the privateenterprises. And then put forward the problems and the causes of these problems,and the simplified method of the state-owned enterprises’ complex agencyrelationship.3. Empirical research. By analyzing the simplified agency relationship, thisarticle proposes key measures to optimize the agency relationship in state-ownedenterprises. And make the empirical research of the feasibility and the possible resultof these measures, and then propose the incentives.4. Countermeasures. According to the situation in state-owned enterprises, and the analysis of the empirical findings, this article proposes measures to optimize theagency relationship in state-owned enterprises, measures including systemconstruction, clearly defined functions, aspects of the reform, incentives andassessment oversight mechanisms.The conclusions are as follows:The long principal-agent chain is the leading cause of inefficient state-ownedenterprise management. The problems about complex agency relationship andunclear responsibilities and rights should be resolved gradually by the property rightreform, the SASAC functions division and market-oriented principal-agentrelationship.In improving efficiency of the operation and management of state-ownedenterprises, the article proposes that both incentive and restrictive measures shouldbe taken according to the nature and the operating characteristics of state-ownedenterprises. To strengthen the control of the national economy on and realize thevalue adding goals of our state-owned assets.The innovation of this paper are as follows:The government-corporate agency relationship is the most representative onein state-owned enterprises agency relationship. The empirical study on thisrelationship provides ideas and methods to further study on the government functionrole and the corporate function role.This article simplify the complex agency relationship of the stare-ownedenterprises. And put forward policy recommendations to optimize agencyrelationship.