Research On Competitive State-owned Enterprises Professional Managers’ Incentive And Restraint Mechanism

State-owned enterprises are the pillar of China’s economy, the quality of the state-owned business performance affects the national economy’s development. In our state-owned enterprises, due to the separation of ownership and management rights, and the so-called “absence of owners”,theoretical existence and actual conflicts of state-owned enterprise agency relationship between the government and the managers make insufficient incentive and constraint. How to motivate managers become a more prominent issue to the Chinese state-owned enterprise reform. Therefore, to build a scientific, systematic effective incentive and restraint mechanisms and professional managers market to meet modern market economy requires,is to improve the operational efficiency of state-owned capital,to prevent loss of state assets, to achieve the objective requirements of state-owned assets,to deepen economic reform.Methes include the theoretical research, empirical analysis. This article USES method of combining the case study and comparative study. Firstly introduces the incentive-restricted mechanism of state-owned enterprise managers’ theoretical basis,including principal-agent theory and incentive theory. On the basis of theorey,making defining of competitive state-owned enterprises, state-owned enterprises and basic categories of professional managers. Next,make an empirical analysis of the short-term and long-term incentive means effect to the enterprise, and then through on-the-spot investigation, case analysis, comparative analysis of Shanghai, mastering the problems of state-owned enterprise managers incentive and constraint mechanism.Through the above analysis, put forward optimization design thought of competitive state-owned enterprises managers incentive constraint mechanism:the incentive-restricted mechanism include the selection of managers,incentive system and constraintmechanism.According to the combination of short and long term, as well as the combination of material and spiritual ways, the combination of equity and efficiency principle, construction state-owned enterprise managers team including manager market selection, appointment, management and exit. From the quality and quantity assurance manager team’s strong comprehensive competitiveness. Through the market attractive salary incentive mechanism, growth promotion channels, elastic welfare safeguard mechanism and constraint mechanism, to improve and enrich the system of state-owned enterprise managers incentive mechanism. Through the establishment of incentive and constraint mechanism to promote the construction of the managers of state-owned enterprises, to promote the system of mechanism, expecting this research can help the reform of state-owned enterprises in China.