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The Research Of Doctor-patient Collusion In National Medical Insurance

Posted on:2013-11-10Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z ZhenFull Text:PDF
GTID:2249330395982058Subject:Western economics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the development of the economy and society, as well as the improvement of life standard, awareness of well-beings has increased. Therefore, the medical insurance system that is closely related with people’s health has brought great attention. The present medical insurance system in our country has made a great progress,However, there remains many issues. This paper mainly studies the doctor-patient conspiracy ethics and moral risks under current medical insurance system.Medical insurance system is the starting point to fulfill people’s basic health needs; at the same time, the design of the medical insurance system also affects the demand and supply behavior in health service, resulting in different incentive mechanism. At present, the frauds involving medical insurance accomplished by doctor and patient has emerged to the public, which is one of the causes of increasing medical expenses.According to the Principal-agent Theory, Information Asymmetry Theory, and the theory of moral hazard analysis of medical service market’s particularity, the article analysed that the medical services market was a highly specialized market with information asymmetry in the medical insurance. In a system including doctors, patients and medica insurance, the medical service which supplis in terms of information has absolute superiority.That is the reason which sets the stage for the Principal-agent problems and the moral risk problems. Then, the article analysed the motivations, reasons and the effects, which were caused by both the supply and the demand sides of medical service, and Doctor-patient collusions.The model in this paper used game theory to analyze the game relation between medical insurance organization behavior and medical demand and medical insurance organization behavior and medical service. A series of parameters associated with them,Medical insurance institution choice behavior supervision and supervision two, medical service of demand-side and supply-side choose conspiracy and conspiracy in two, different combinations of strategies, search for the game equilibrium point, thus the parameters to the behavioral effects, so that,in the final against these influencing factors Put forward suggestions and measures.
Keywords/Search Tags:moral hazard, doctor-patient collusion, game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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