State-owned Enterprises Corporate Governance Under The Director Of Rent-seeking Behavior Research

The quality of corporate governance of state owned enterprises is very important for the development of China’s economy. But on the actual situation of corporate governance for China’s state owned enterprises, the phenomenon of insides misappropriate state assets still exists, that the original intention of the introduction of corporate governance has not been achieved. Therefore, from the perspective of rent-seeking, this paper combines the disciplines of company law, institutional economics, rent-seeking economics, analyzing the rent-seeking behavior of the directors of state-owned enterprises. The paper is divided into five parts, the first part is mainly made related presentations on the board of directors governance of state-owned enterprises and rent-seeking theory ideology, the second part defines three types state-owned enterprises through analyzing its nature and properties, and then described the different characteristics of the board of directors of this three types in terms of laws and regulations, The third part analyzes the three different types of state-owned enterprises directors how to take rent-seeking and its main way. The fourth part discusses the root cause of the directors of rent-seeking through a general cost-benefit analysis, and then contrasts their rent-seeking behaviors. The fifth part is the last part of this paper, this part puts forward the feasibility of strategies that should perfect the governance of the board of directors of state-owned enterprises from institutional and non-institutional aspects, and thus improve the corporate governance of state-owned enterprises in order to fundamentally curb the directors of state-owned enterprise rent-seeking behaviors.