The Analysis Of The Rent-seeking Phenomenon In State-owned Enterprise Property Right System Reform

As an important link in the reform of our country economic system, the state-owned enterprise property right system reform is also one of focus which attracts the attention of personages in economic circles. Even the reform of state-owned enterprises is being pushed ahead step by step, but the result of which is less than satisfactory. The phenomena and problems as the huge loss of state-owned assets, the serious market order confusion, and the loss of honesty and trusty, which have close connection with rent-seeking, test whether our government feel relieved when the market,"invisible hand",get the right of the resources allocation.Since1979, the reform of state-owned enterprises has experienced three stages:1978-1984,the phase of releasing rights and interests,1985-1993,the phase of two powers discrete,1994-1999, the phase of the establishment of modern enterprise system,guide our state-owned enterprise step by step,from the "big government",which exist in original pure planned economy, to the "minimum government",in which market decide everything, in which two kinds of extreme economic system, there is not easy to appear the phenomenon of rent-seeking. Assumed the capacity of resources allocation of the "big government" is1, and the capacity of resources allocation of the "minimum government" is0, then the phenomenon of rent-seeking emerge between0and1.However, extreme system is not exist in real economy, that is to say, in real economy, the government’s capacity of resources capacity is between0and1, which provides a survival soil for rent-seeking.This article plan to analyze the patterns of various stakeholders’ behavior in the process of the state-owned enterprises reform by using the rent-seeking theory and game theory,plan to discuss institutional origins of the rent-seeking behavior and attempt to put forward some feasible suggestions.The innovation of this paper lies in rent-seeking cost perspective by using cost benefit analysis on rent-seeking behaviors.then use the game theory to build the three party game among government, purchaser and rent-seekers, while get a balanced solution by using a mathematical model derived from the various stakeholders, to prove there is a positive correlation between rent-seeking scale and supervision cost. At last, we want to put forward the corresponding countermeasufes:improving the efficiency of supervision, improving the civil service wage, etc., to form a set of automatic mechanism, so as to reduce the occurrence of rent-seeking behavior. The frame of this article:The first chapter is the introduction, introduced the research background and significanceThe second chapter is the introduction of the first economics theory:the theory of rent-seekingThe third chapter is the introduction of the second theory:Game TheoryThe fourth chapter discusses the causes and manifestations of rent-seeking behavior in different stages of state-owned enterprises reform, and tries to analyze the consequences of rent-seeking.The fifth Chapter the game theory is applied to the analysis of the rent-seeking phenomenon in state-owned enterprise property right system reform, and we attempt to establish a three party game model, and according which, to explore how to reduce state-owned enterprises’loss to minimum.The sixth chapter is the conclusion and suggestions, this chapter will summarize the above chapters, and puts forward the proposal.