Theory Of China’ Listed Family Company Professional Managers Equity Incentive And Restraint Mechanism

Although the Gome "Huang Chen War" is over, voting on the control of Gome isregarded as a turning point of the corporate governance structure evolution. Mr Huang’sgovernance is on the premise of guaranteeing ownership, which surely gets the socialrecognition. Mr Chen’s governance is altisonant, which takes advantage of the others’unfavorable position. what kind of role and self orientation are the professional managersplaying in modern enterprises,"Huang Chen War" also provides a classic case which can bestudied carefully for many family enterprises in China,making the family enterprises payunprecedented attention on the Equity incentives during process of the company’sdevelopment.As the process and end of the equity division reform, Chinese stock marketsushered in the new era of full circulation.Equity incentives gradually become the new themeof listed companies in China and the capital market.How to make equity stimulate andrestrain professional managers in the listed family company becomes the focus.This paper’research object is listed family companies that implemented equity incentivebetween2009and2011,this paper study the professional managers’equity incentives andrestraint system from corporate governanc perspective under the guidance of equityincentives’ binding theory,to design a family managers’equity incentive and restraint systemwhich is suitable for the development of modem listed family companies. In the theoreticalpart,first of all this paper introduced the concepts and relevant theoretical basis of listedcompany and the equity incentives.Then taking the listed family companies as example,thispaper analysed the professional manager’s position, function, and the principle-agentrelationship with the board of directors.Finally, this paper tested empirically the mechanismsof action between shareholders meeting and board of directors,and found it is not perfect.professional manager’s power is stronger than the company law,which makes companies riskthe organizations’ crisis,and this paper put forward countermeasures and suggestions thatcompanies need to perfect the internal governance mechanism and external governancemechanisms in order to stimulate and restrain professional managers.This paper uses the method of combining normative analysis and case analysis, valuingcombining normative research and empirical research a lot. This paper defined the listedfamily company and equity incentives before doing empirical research,and studied the equityincentive theory and principle-agent theory.Based on the above study,this paper studied thelisted family company which implemented equity incentive with the latest data of samplecompanies between2009and2011, and then studied the effect of equity incentives forlisted family company. The possible innovation of this paper are the following points, including valuing theequity incentives incentive for listed family companies a lot, and puts forward measures ofhow to avoid or reduce the professional managers’betrayal.this paper tentatively study howthe venture entrepreneurials can preserve their own power during capital operation,providing theory basis and practical guidance for establishing and perfecting theprofessional managers’incentive and restraint system.To perfect the research on listed familycompanies corporate governance structure is helpful for enriching the corporate governancetheory，establishing and perfecting the professional managers’incentive and restraint systemas well as improving enterprise management level. therefore, this research is of greattheoretical importance and practical importance.