Study On The Incentive And Restrictive Mechanism Of Peasant Households’Safe Vegetables Production Behavior Based On The Organizations Perspective

In general, safe vegetable production in Jiangsu Province is in good shape and the management of pollution-free agriculture products, green food and organic food has been in a far-reaching progress. In reality, much information asymmetry exist in the production of safe vegetables between producers and consumers, producers and grass-roots level managers, producers and government and so on, which leads to the producers’ adverse selection and moral hazard behavior. Safe vegetable production involves many socio-economic environmental factors except the farmers, so the measure to ensure the standardized production of safe vegetables is a combination of many factors, including the appropriate government regulation, a sound market system, and feasible modes of production organization and so on. The strength of government, the market and the organization have an effect on production behavior of farmers. Based on the effect of these three aspects, the establishment of a incentive and restrictive mechanism about safe vegetable production can solve the problems of information asymmetry and prevent the emergence of peasant households’moral hazard effectively. In recent years, more and more specialized cooperative economic organizations in agriculture have been established, and these organizations are able to realize the professional division of labor, increase the ability to resist risks, reduce the occurrence of moral hazard in its internal. According to the trends in agricultural development of Jiangsu Province, the family management is still the most important vegetable production form. As independent vegetable producers, the small farmers does not exist professional division, which determines the weaker ability to resist risks and the occurrence of moral hazard behavior is increased. Therefore, the establishment of professional cooperative organizations is more suitable for the production of vegetable.The development of specialized farmers’cooperatives has been identified as the needs of agriculture development in Jiangsu Province, and the government has planned the development of the cooperation in Jiangsu Province and cleared to support instructions on agricultural cooperative organizations. As vegetable production in Jiangsu Province is in large scale, farmers in many areas have established various cooperative economic organizations. Meanwhile, they generate a good impact on the effective supply of vegetables, the development of industry and increasing the income of farmers. The basic model of safe vegetables production organization is "production base+farmers", which is the base of other types of organizations.The research about vegetables production management has been very broad at home and abroad. This paper analyzes the production of safe vegetable in Jiangsu Province by reviewing the previous study about vegetable quality and safety management, producer behavior, the market, government regulation and agricultural economy organization, on the base of asymmetric information theory, producers theory and incentive and restrictive theory.This paper selects Nanjing, Yangzhou, Nantong, and Xuzhou as the survey districts which can represent as the different model of vegetables production area in Jiangsu Province, selects farmers who work in the safe vegetable production base as the research object. By analyzing the personal characteristics, production characteristics and the monitoring of organizations, we can find that:the scale of single family which products safe vegetable in the survey area is usually not large. Generally, the farmers’literacy is low and the food safety awareness is weak for the most farmers. Most farmers have a smattering of knowledge on production standards, relevant certification system and the basic concepts. The guidance and technical training for farmers is relatively weak and there are not sufficient mechanism for good communication between the producers and management. The all lead to the occurrence of moral hazard behavior in the production of safe vegetables.By testing the validity of survey data, the empirical result suggests that:farmers who only involved in the organization form of the "production base+farmers" tend to develop moral hazard more easily; and the organization’s safety training program for farmers is ineffective and there is no significant effect on the producing behavior of farmers. The producing behavior of farmers is hardly subjected to organization’s inspection of the environment; the collective purchasing of agricultural means production can not make an impact on preventing moral hazard. Organization’s unified arrangement or guidance of the pesticide application for the production of safe vegetable of peasant household, supervisions from the organization on the producing process and the detection on farmers picking products might reduce the probability of the moral hazard behavior. At the same time, with a punishment for farmers’illegal producing behavior, moral hazard is less likely to occur.The incentive and restraint mechanism on safe vegetable production in Jiangsu Province consists of stress and urge and policies incentives. The stress and urge include: the establishment of quality control system within the organization, strengthening propaganda and education, improving the quality of farmers, enhancing the management quality, and improving the punishment mechanism; Policy incentives include:Adhering to the principle of the organization establishment, establishing an effective communication mechanism, helping farmers to increase revenue, improving the internal reward system and improving the organization service function.