Retailers With Risk Aversion Compete And Collaborate Through Pricing And Delivery Time

At the age of e-commerce, market demand is no longer just price-sensitive, the impactof time factor is also play an important roles and its impact is growing. Price and deliverytime have come together to become the factors that leading customer needs and become moreand more important. As MTO mode is the main mode of operation of e-commerce, retailersprimarily through providing a competitive price and delivery time combination strategy toobtain the demand. Therefore the research on price and delivery time is of practicalsignificance.On the basis of realistic background, the paper based on the research of relevantliterature, propose a basic mode about the analysis of the retailers decision-makingbehavior about the price and delivery time strategy. Then it discusses the decision-makingbehavior of two retailers under competitive and collaborative situation when their productshave alternative characteristics. In which the thesis built models with and without servicelevel constrains respectively, and make a comparative analysis under Bertrand duopoly gameand Stackelberg duopoly game. Since the introduction of retailer has risk aversion, the paperalso discusses the impact of risk aversion on the decision-making behavior. Finally, above theresearch, the thesis takes a supplier into the mode and analysis the impact of supplier simpact on retailers decision-making behavior and its own decision-making behavior.Through the compare of these optimal strategies in each model, we get the followingconclusions: excessive risk aversion will put retailers at a competitive disadvantage and it canmake its competitor better; the expected utilities of retailers are higher under Stackelbergduopoly Game than Bertrand duopoly Game when there are only two retailers but no supplierin the market; retailers price will decrease along with the increase of average delivery time;the optimal solution is limited by the service level constraints, service level constraints havean negative impact on expected utilities; when take supplier into consideration, the more thatretailer afraid of risk, the lower profit that the supplier will get, so supplier should avoidcooperating with retailer of risk aversion; supplier s benefit is higher in Bertrand duopolygame than in Stackelberg duopoly game, while the two retailers expected utilities are both lower in Bertrand duopoly game than in Stackelberg duopoly game; And like some otherliteratures about centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making, the paperget the similar conclusion that centralized decision-making is better than decentralizeddecision-making.