The Cause, Decision-making Process And Performance Of Collective Forest Tenure Reform

As the decision-maker of Chinese farmland institutional change and innovation have been transforming from the state to the local village since1978, the induced power, local government, and power structure and decision-making process of village have been playing an increasing role in the farmland institutional change and innovation. The new round of collective forest tenure reform has provided a rare opportunity for testing and deepening academic study on approach and village’decision-making process of Chinese farmland institutional change. Based on deep investigation of collective forest tenure reform in Shang fang village, Jian’ou city, Fujian province with a method of field survey of anthropology, the paper employs institutional change theory in neo-institution economics to study on the cause, decision-making process and performance of the second round of collective forest tenure reform in Shang fang village in the context of national administrative power gradually withdrawing from and market power gradually affecting rural areas, and political power within village having been highlighted, and reveals how induced force, the local government, and political power within village interact and gives direction judgment of farmland institutional change.The paper is divided into seven chapters. First of all, the paper reviews home and abroad research on motive, approach and performance of our country’s land institutional change and points out studies on game interaction of induced power, local government, and power structure and decision-making process of village in the course of land institutional change, on the causes and performance of various woodland institutional models should be strengthened. And then the paper analyzes mechanism of various induced powers and political power on the collective forest tenure reform in Shang fang village, especially highlighting decision-making process and outcome research on the structure of social and political power in Shang fang village toward allocating forest, and makes simple appraisal in terms of reform performance and equity. Finally the paper draws conclusions.The conclusions are as follows:(1) The adjustment of the woodland in Shang fang village was triggered by some induced power, such as the increase of population pressure on land, a change in bargaining power due to change in the population structure, appreciation of resource, the pushing of village elite, but government policy which promoted consensus in the village by endowing the political legitimacy for the forest tenure reform made the reform really occur. That is to say, this reform was not only a compulsory institutional change, but also a induced institutional change that had its own motive.(2) The village elite, family forces based on the kinship were the decision makers of Shang fang village’woodland institutional change, a powerful interest group determined institutional choice and implement of "Two field system" in Shang fang village.(3)"Two field system" in Shang Fang village brought improvement to the woodland operational efficiency, it also brought severe inequity and subsequently induced labor market and unstable in Shang Fang village.(4)Its implication on Chinese land policy is that power structure and decision-making process of village are the key factors to determine direction, choice and performance of farmland institutional change. The land institutional arrangement and its performance vary with different political structure and decision-making process of village.