Research Of Tunneling, Propping And Capital Investment Of Listed Companies Based On Related Transactions

Controlling Stockholder’s tunneling behavior of listed companies is that the controllingshareholder takes up the resources from the company. Controlling Stockholder’s proppingbehavior of listed companies is that the company takes up capital from controllingstockholders. Related party transactions, especially controlling shareholders occupy thecapital of listed companies was widespread concern of academics and regulatory agencies.This article research on the relationship of tunneling, propping behavior and capitalinvestment from the point of view of the related transactions of the listed companies, reviewhow controlling shareholders’ tunneling, propping affect the capital investment of listedcompanies, and explore whether different nature of property right has different effect oncapital investment.This paper uses the way of the combination of the theoretical analysis and empirical testto research on the relationship of tunneling, propping behavior and capital investment basedon the listed companies of China. Through the literature review and the basis of analysis oninvestment behavior related theory and the enterprise investment model, this paper putsforward the hypothesis. Empirical test is mainly to the total sample and tunneling group andpropping group for the multiple regression analysis, the tunneling group and the proppinggroup samples separately groups according to property rights to invite a regression analysisof the data, and based on this, to further explore the behavior of the ST existing support groupand the ST group data regression results’ differences, and draw conclusions:1, in the listedcompanies where existing tunneling behavior capital investment and related party tunnelingdegree have a significant negative correlation, a certain degree of related party tunnelingincreased suppress capital investment increasing.2, considering the nature of property rightresults may vary, this study found: although both have a negative correlation, comparedwith the state holding listed companies, in non-state-owned holding listed company, the moremoney being tunneling, the stronger sensitivity (the beta coefficient) of lessening the listedcompany capital investment.3, in the listed companies existing the propping behavior capitalinvestment and related party propping degree have a significant positive correlation, theincrease of related party propping, to a certain extent, promote the increase of capital investment.4, considering the nature of property right results may vary, this study found:both are related, but non-state-owned holding listed companies get the greater the relatedparty propping, the stronger the sensitivity (the beta coefficient) to increase capitalinvestment.5, compared with the non-ST listed company, in ST listed company the increaseof related party propping promote the increase of capital investment.