The Behavior Research Of Tunneling In The Related Party M&A

In recent years, following Chinese rapid economic development and the improvement of our security market, the merger and acquisition(M&A) become more common. Some companies which belong to the same group company(brother companies) exist the M&A behaviors; these behaviors are gradually found as hidden problems by insider. Academic research suggests that through the listed company and brother companies’ M&A, some controlling shareholders achieve profit transfer. At last, the hidden profit way brings harm to the interest of minority shareholders.In the paper, I depend on the typical case analysis to research this phenomenon. From2011 to 2014, the Yutong Group Company makes the Jingyida Company(yutong’s sub company) have excellent business performance by way of related party M&A, it capital injection to Jingyida Company in advance and prompt brother company’s related party M&A in high premium. In the end, the controlling shareholders hold large profit. This case studies the changing economic data in the related party M&A which takes the tunneling as purpose.In the research on this case, firstly, I define the relevant definitions and introduce the background, process and method of this case. And then, I analysis the economic consequences of this related party M&A in many respects, such as market reaction and index movement. On the one hand, I conclude the reason of tunneling in related party M&A. according to the conclusion. On the other hand, I take some advice to adjust the Yutong Car’s ownership structure, and present strategies to relevant regulatory departments...