Research On The Influencing Factors Of Tunneling Related-Party M&A Of Listed Company

Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) is a mean of achieving economic restructuring、 industrial upgrading and optimizing resource allocation. With the accelerated development of globalization economic, the capital market plays a more and more important role in our country’s economy. As one of the major themes of the capital markets, M&A will inevitably become a double-edged sword in the competition of the globalization of Chinese enterprise. However, in the capital market with Chinese characteristics, M&A can easily become controlling stakes’ important way to occupy the interests of minority shareholders and hollow out the company which will seriously restrict long stable development of capital market. Therefore, this paper try to find out the influencing factor to reduce or incentive the related-party M&A tunneling behavior on the basis of the corporate governance mechanism of investor protection and external governance environment interaction, which can provide the basis for the management authorities to make policy and correctly guide the healthy development of the capital market.In view of the special background of China’s capital market, combined with the research of scholars at home and aboard, this article firstly verifies the tunneling of related-party M&A through observing and studying the financial index; then this article takes517M&A events among shanghai A-shares listed company as the sample and uses logistic regression to explore the relationship between the hollowed-related M&A and the various factors. At the same time, author divides the sample into two groups in accordance with the quality of the environment of investor protection to investigate whether the results are not the same. The results of event-study and accounting-study show that related parties have an motivation to tunnel the company.In addition, the logistic regression empirical results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the shareholder ownership’ concentration and tunneling related parties when the governance environment is good; the effects of the concentration of the other shareholder and information-disclosured doesn’t play.The framework of this paper is divided into five chapters:Chapter Ⅰ, introduction; Chapter Ⅱ, the concepts and theories of related-party M&A and investor protection; Chapter Ⅲ, related-party M&A and investor protection; Chapter IV, analysis on the influencing factors of tunneling related-party M&A; Chapter V, empirical analysis on the influencing factors of tunneling related-party M&A.