China's Entry Into The International Economic Motivation And Benefits Of The Organization

Under the assumption of benefits preference of game theory, this article analysesthe motivations and benefits that China participates in international economicinstitutions while the economic sovereignty will be restricted, with a repeated nonzerosum game model and a "tit for tat" strategy. Firstly, makes a simple analysis on theoverview of international economic institutions, concepts and contents of nationaleconomic sovereignty, as well as the phenomenon that the restrictions on nationaleconomic sovereignty brought by international economic institutions, and thenassumes the preference of benefits and makes an analysis of game theory under it.This article holds the opinion that the international economic relationship bases on theabsolute preference of benefits, and the international economic behaviour is repeatednonzero sum games, with the "tit for tat" strategy of Axelrod, draws a conclusion thatreplacing the Nash Equilibrium with the Pareto Optimal will be a win-win choice fornations, by joining international economic institutions and participating ininternational economic cooperation. Finally, this article makes a preliminary reflectionon how to protect national economic interests in international economic institutionsfrom China’s point. Based on the previous discussions and a brief review on thedevelopment, as well as the relatively disadvantaged situation of China ininternational economic institutions, makes an analysis on ways response tointernational economic institutions from three respects as follows: absolute benefits,nonzero sum games and repeated games, believing that participating in internationaleconomic institutions actively, turning attention to the whole benefits of alliances andplacing more emphasis on learning and using mechanism, and then having aninfluence on the process of mechanism rebuilding are the most valuable issues forChina.