Empirical Analysis Of State-owned Listed Companies' Stock Option Incentive In China

In the1930's, with the gradually disperse of listed companies' stake in the controllingshareholder and complexity of management techniques, the phenomenon of Owner and operatorseparation emerges. This phenomenon becomes prominent since1960's. Due to the informationasymmetry, the owner cannot effective supervise the operator. In the late1980's, stock optionincentive is used by most listed companies for senior management to synchronize the targetbetween owner and operator. In the1990's, stock option incentive becomes the main income ofsenior management. Western countries, such as United Kingdoms, Canadian and French startedusing stock option incentive. It can be seen that stock option incentive has been widely accepted.However, in the late1990's, Some well-known enterprises and accounting firms, such as Enron andWorldCom, have attracted questions for conspired financial fraud. The stock option incentiveshould be dialectically inspected. As a double edged sword, it have positive effects on PrincipleAgent Relationship while there are certain defects.In recent years, deepening reforming is placed as the first location beyond all other works bystate-owned listed companies in china. Around the companies' development, they vigorouslypromoted the shareholding system, perfected the corporate governance structure and provide strongpower for the development of the company. Alongside the deepening of state owned enterprises'reform, the Organization and management system of listed companies have changed greatly.However, the inner control and morality risk emerged gradually. State-owned enterprisesmanagement has different targets with the owner and use the power of attorney. This will lead toSerious loss of state-owned assets, the low efficiency of the utilization of assets and lack of energyin enterprises. There exists co-deficient of Incentive mechanism and restricting mechanism. Thishas Restrict state-owned listed company's sustainable development in our country. Therefore, listedcompanies study and practice stock option incentive warmly after it is introduced into our country.This dissertation takes the state-owned listed companies as study object. It is based on thestock option incentive theory and use empirical analysis to analyze the current state and practicalproblems in performing stock option incentive. It also take examples from western developedcountries' practice in stock option incentive. Aimed at the problems of the practice in stock optionincentive of stated owned listed companies, a specialized stock option incentive framework isdesigned according to the practical situation of our country. Finally, the problems in applying stockoption incentive in our country is analyze from both macroscopic and microscopic perspective. Meanwhile, effective solutions are proposed to improve current stock option incentive system ofstate owned listed companies in our country.