The Empirical Research On Performance Of Option Incentive Within Native Listed Companies

As a long-term incentive mechanism to solve the principal-agent problem in management, option incentive has been already widely used in enterprise management in the early 1980s in western countries, and great success has been achieved. From the 1990s, theorists and practice began to study this incentive mechanism, and came to put it into practice carefully in recent years in several areas of China, but they did not obtain the rational effect as a result of the special restriction supervision mechanism and corporate governance structure. Owning to the financial crisis in 2008, half option incentive within management come across more challenge than before, because when the underlying price fell lower than the exercise price, the management will find it difficult to exercise the option,otherwise they will be trapped. Based on this point, option incentive, again become the focus among scholars.With the aim of confirming the performance of option incentive in native listed companies and finding out the reason behind, the paper carried out the empirical analysis. Based on the explanation of important concepts and introduction of based theories, the author constructed a performance evaluation model and a linear regression model, taking native listed companies as a sample, and solved the two models using the data from the sample above, using the software SPSS 17.0 and matlab2009b, furthermore, estimation of equation and fitting of curve were also made, accordingly, factors that affect company performance have been recognized and screened, and explanation were also gave from the view of statistics and economics according to the measurement results.It can be inferred from the empirical results that, the linear correlation between comprehensive performance of companies and option incentive,executives shareholding proportion,implementation schedules and asset liability ratio is slight. Through the microscopic analysis of regression model, the paper shows that the nonlinear relationship between comprehensive performance and incentive mode,industry difference and enterprise properties are also weak. That is, the positive relationship only lies between comprehensive performance and the implementation schedules of option incentive, Base on this, the author believes that the comprehensive performance of option incentive is basically invalid, but it is closely related to the expectation of the management towards the future.As to the structure of the paper, it is divided into six chapters. The first chapter is the introduction of the background, the purpose, the meaning, the main content, the framework and the methods of the research. The second chapter is introduced is the literature review, including the introduction of theoretical basis and important concept, and the question to be studied. The third chapter and the fourth chapter are designed to make research designing, data processing, model solving and micro analysis. The last two chapters are the summary of the empirical results; follow which are countermeasures and suggestions accordingly.