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The Banlance Of Interests In Agricultural Insurance

Posted on:2011-02-17Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J L PanFull Text:PDF
GTID:2219330368985161Subject:Agricultural extension
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In this moden society, the Secondary industry and Tertiary Industry is developing at a rapid speed. While in the other hand, as the basis of national economy, the weakness of agriculture is gradually reflected. Agriculture,which is different from other economic activities, has always been threatened by various risks from nature and market. As we all know, due to high risk and compensation rate, any company that supply agricultural insurance will suffer low interests or even no interests. And that's one of the reasons why agricultural insurance industry has no driving force. But as quasi-public good, agricultural insurance has external effect and therefore, deserve support from government. This paper focus on two points:the first is how the Government subsidies should be divided between peasants and insurance company; the second is how much financial allocation should be enough to encourage peasants to choose agricultural insurance.In this paper, we establish a theory framework, containing theories of games, quasi-public goods, peasants'attitude and behavior on risks. Under this framework, we discuss the policy-supported insurance model in Huangyan District and its effect, from macro and micro perspectives. Specifically speaking, it contains reviews about the current situation in the agricultural insurance market in Huangyan District, the coverage, the implementation effect, the amount of government subsidies on agricultural insurance development, etc. and then, take Huangyan Districtas an example, according the statistic data, we give a analysis on the every group in the agricultural insurance market——farmers, insurance companies, government's influence on improving agricultural insurance development and each group's behavior when risk appears. And therefore we'll get a theoretical and empirical support on how to develop agricultural insurance more effective.Finally, according to conclusions we've got above, this paper gives some effective policy countermeasures to solve the problems of agriculture insurance in Huangyan District.
Keywords/Search Tags:Agricultural insurance, Policy subsidy, Game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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