A Research On Motivation-Supervision Model Of Public Project Based On Principal Agent Theory

Since 2004, the state council put forward to speed up the government investment projects and, after more than ten years of development, the government investment projects has become the domestic government investment projects, especially one of the typical models of infrastructure construction. This paper thoroughly studies the system of investing and financing theory, economic theory, public management theory, game theory and other theories disciplines, on the basis of the connotation of government investment project, the main body relations as well as the key content is defined and detailed analysis of the principal-agent relationship and mechanism of the mechanism. On the way, in addition to the qualitative theory elaboration, this project at the same time pay attention to the model, the use of quantitative methods, through the construction of a multi-level principal-agent model to participate in the interests of the principal mechanisms for analysis.Based on the domestic model of the main problems existing in the practice as the background, we deem the government as a client, and the management company as agent respectively, which based on the assumption of complete rationality and limited rationality incentives-supervision under the framework of principal-agent model. From the point of the results of analysis, incentive mechanism and supervision mechanism is affecting the behavior of agents (project management), the important factors that improve incentive compensation and the strict supervision system can promote the project management company’s conscientious in accordance with the requirements of the contract management work; On the other hand, the low pay and lax regulation is likely to lead to the project management company for private gain.When considering the project management company has the pursuit of fairness preference "reciprocity" behavior, the government can give them extra more preferential policies, in return, the project management company will pay more effort to carry out the construction work. In addition, compared with the traditional principal-agent theory framework of supervision cost, into equity preference model can to a certain extent, the government’s supervision and cost saving; At the same time, with the traditional principal-agent framework under the government’s expected revenue, compared to under the condition of considering fairness preference, the government can get more income depends on the strength of "reciprocity" behavior of the project company, project company "reciprocity" psychological stronger, the greater the likelihood of government for extra revenue.