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Research On The Income Distribution Of TPL Alliance Based On Evolutionary Game And Shapley Value

Posted on:2013-02-24Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y J WangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2210330362961387Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Along with the rapid development of specialization and e-commerce, more and more large manufacturers and retailers choose to outsource their own logistics to the third party logistics enterprise. Against this background, a lot of logistics enterprises choose to get together to form alliances, in order to save money and realize advantage complementation. Then, they can participate in the market competition by the form of alliances. Facts have proved that the logistics alliance can not only effectively reduce the logistics cost, but also improve the competition ability of enterprises in the alliance. When the cooperation among members increases, logistics partners can have more and more communication. That is good for sharing information, establishing mutual trust, and reducing the risk faced by the alliance. But we can see a lot of failure cases of logistics alliance in the operation process. Investigating its reason, we can find these two points. One is the lack of participation will of logistics enterprises; the other is the unfair distribution of alliance's interests. These two reasons can make union members leave alliance, which will cause the failure of the alliance.This paper introduces the idea of evolutionary game. The formation of the logistics alliance is seen as the stable state of logistics enterprises through a long-term process. Using the evolutionary game model, this paper studied evolution process of logistics alliance. The results showed that, the initial participation will of logistics enterprises has an important impact on the foundation of the logistics alliance. Only when the initial participation will of each enterprise is more than a critical probability, the logistics alliance can form stably. On this basis, this paper further studies on the distribution of logistics alliance income by using Shapley value model of cooperative game theory. Finally, the article demonstrated how to get the stability of the logistics alliance through the comprehensive utilization of this paper's conclusion.
Keywords/Search Tags:TPL alliance, Evolutionary game, Shapley value
PDF Full Text Request
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