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Professional Managers, Recruitment And Selection Model Based On Game Analysis

Posted on:2007-04-09Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J G ZhaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2209360185982326Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since 18 centuries, with the industrial revolution occurring and developing and Universal application of mechanized massive production. The size of enterprise was increasing. The defects of Park management gradually emerged, Corporate embarked on the stage of history, and then professional manager came into being. Professional managers Rely on their own capability to obtain the control of enterprises and the competence of professional managers are becoming one of the key factors affecting enterprise performance. Recruiting high-quality professional managers become the most important for improving enterprise performance. Therefore, studying recruitment and selection of professional manager is of great significance.During the process of professional manager recruitment and selection, there always exists asymmetric information between enterprise and professional manager. The competence of professional manager is only known by himself, while the enterprise knows little about it. For the sake of recruiting professional manager with high-quality, the enterprise will make efforts to collect the professional manager's information, but professional manager always tends to minimize his disadvantages and maximize his advantages. Therefore, the process of professional manager recruitment and selection is a game between both sides.By analyzing professional manager recruitment and selection with game theory, this article suggests a system of measures to overcome adverse selection of professional manager recruitment and selection. First, by dynamic game theoretic analysis with incomplete information, this article suggests a series of measures: find out the information of professional manager by enlarging recruitment scope and adopting various assessment measures; review professional manager by setting a probation; make it difficult to gain anticipant income for low-quality professional managers by adopting incentive-restriction measures. Secondly, Signaling Games model introduces how high-quality professional managers differentiate themselves from low-quality professional managers by signals. Thirdly, reputation model advances perfect reputation mechanism can restrict adverse selection. Finally, human capital development and professional ethic construction of professional managers also can...
Keywords/Search Tags:Professional Manager, Recruitment and Selection, Game Theoretic Analysis
PDF Full Text Request
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