| Korea problem has been the most important Cold War legacy of East Asia, and North Korean nuclear issue has always been one of the key factors influencing the peace and stability of Asia-Pacific Region. Starting by 1992, a fierce nuclear crisis had broken out between US and North Korean, which is centered on the nuclear ambition and inspection of North Korean nuclear facilities. However, the United States, as the single superpower in the world, did not really succeed in achieving its ideal foreign policy target. Since October 2002, a new round of North Korean nuclear crisis has cast a shadow over the peace and stability on Asia-Pacific region again. The development and solution of the first nuclear crisis thus presents a great research value to the ease of nowadays tension. Nevertheless, very much to our disappointment, little has been done in the analysis of the game, the interaction between US and North Korea, followed by their individual payoff preferences and strategies correspondingly adopted. Thus, the author has found the motivation of conduct some research on this particular topic.The thesis is divided into 6 chapters in accordance with the analysis structures characterized by the theoretical framework, game analysis of the origination, development and solution of the crisis. The first chapter is an overall account of the theoretical framework employed. Chapter Two is devoted to the discussion of the background of the nuclear crisis. Chapter Three deals with the breakout of the first North Korean nuclear crisis. Chapter Four presents a study of the ease and escalation of the nuclear crisis. Chapter Five explores the explanation of Carter's sudden visit, while the last Chapter offers and extended study of the nowadays nuclear crisis as well as the implication of the tit-for-tat strategy over the solution of today's problem. The last part, Conclusion, summarizes the whole thesis and presents a prediction concerning the possible solution of the new round crisis.It is well known that Prisoners' Dilemma has been an seemingly unsolvable problem of international relations. How to find a way out of the repeated prisoners' dilemma and break through the evil circle brought forth by the individual rationality of individual players is the question that many scholars seek to answer. Based on the theory of the evolution of cooperation by Robert Axelrod, this thesis aims to analyze how US and North Korea, two rational, selfish, self-help players, managed to achieve cooperation by strictly following a game strategy called "tit-for-tat".The study of the repeated prisoners' dilemma between US and North Korea and their individual strategy pattern will provide us with important information on the peace-making between the two. Great change has taken place sincethe first nuclear crisis, which presents many new challenges to the solution of the new round of nuclear crisis. Although up until March 2003, US and North Korea had been sticking to "tit-for-tat" as their policy preference, in the hope that the other side would back off first, as the cold war mentality gradually fading away in Korean Peninsula, a peaceful future for the nuclear crisis could be seriously impaired by such thinking. Under the efforts of China, Six-Party Talk has become a new possibility for the peaceful solution of the North Korean nuclear crisis.The thesis is approximately 25,000 words in length, Most of the documents collected and referred to are the official files and original foreign publications, while some website information is also referred, including the official websites of CNS, IAEA, Arms-control Council etc. |
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