Britain 's Compromise Policy Analysis In "cod Wars"

From the 1950 s to the 1970 s, three militarized conflicts erupted between Britain and Iceland, due to fishery resources dispute. These three conflicts are collectively called the "Cod Wars." As the intensity of these conflicts is not high, the academic community has not put enough attention on studying it. However, the results of the "Cod Wars" are thought-provoking: Three "Cod Wars" all ended with Britain’s compromises, which eventually led to the total decline of the British offshore fishing industry. Why did Britain give in to Iceland for three times? A systematic and comprehensive analysis of this issue will offer new knowledge to IR studies in this field. It will also have important inspiration to states which are in disputes with others to settle their disputes.In order to answer this question systematically and comprehensively, the thesis uses levels of analysis to study the “Cod Wars”. By examining the historical evolution and application of levels of analysis, the thesis establishes a three-level analytic framework, including international level, domestic level and decision-makers level. The three levels contain eight aspects. On different levels the relevant factors are found out and a conclusion is drawn: on the international level, the bipolar confrontation pattern constraints British behavior, the provisions of NATO limits British options, over-reliance on the International Court and United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea pushes Britain into a passive situation, public pressure from other countries reduces the legitimacy of the British action; on the domestic level, multiple national targets dispersed the government’s effort, parliamentary oversight makes the cabinet careful, different interests in the country prevents the government to take a consistent hard-line stance, differences and changes in public opinion interferes with the government’s actions; faced with such international and domestic environment, British policy makers’ awareness of the situation becomes pessimistic, negative and helpless. The combined effect of factors on different levels makes it difficult for Britain to take advantage of it strength. Therefore military operations are confusing and invalid and negotiating activities are passive. Britain has no choice but to compromise in order to end the conflict.While researching the "Cod Wars" with the three-level analytic framework, the thesis also uses a lot of first-hand historical data, including records of British cabinet meetings and parliamentary debates, Prime Minister’s diaries, memoirs and other raw materials. These first-hand historical materials provide a solid factual basis for the analysis.