Supply Chain, Enterprise Coupon Distribution Model And Pricing And Coordination Strategy Study

In order to expand market share and attract repeat customers for the purpose of increasing profits, a growing number of manufacturers and retailers offer coupon to promote their products in order to maximize their profit. Most of enterprises are more concentrated their targets on their own optimal profit than the supply chain system in a non-scientific pricing strategy, thus leads to supply chain system dysfunctional or even chaotic. Current researches only analyze the economic benefits of coupon from the prospect of marketing, or the influence on one enterprise of the supply chain from an operation management point of view. Researching on coordination of coupon offering mode and pricing strategy in supply chain system by combining these two perspectives, will instruct the enterprises in supply chain to make optimal decisions for coupon offering and pricing strategy, and will provide guidance and reference for decision makers.In this paper, we develop general profit maximization models for coordination of optimal price and coupon face value decision in a two-echelon supply chain system. First, we discuss the coupon offered by manufacturer and retailer independently in four different decision models, those are supply chain integration offer coupon mode, manufacturer-offer-coupon mode, retailer-offer-coupon mode and non-offer-coupon mode, comparer the price, coupon face value, coupon offering period and the profit among these four kinds of offering modes. Second, discuss the coupon offering mode models under the non-cooperative game theory offered by manufacturer and retailer contemporaneously, and get the conclusion of strategic decision of manufacturer and retailer by compare with independent offering mode. From the prospect of the whole supply chain system, the optimal decision is retailer-offer-coupon in non-cooperative game. Third, develop a coordination supply chain system model with the cost allocation contract and the revenue sharing contract respectively. By computational experiments, we conclude these two contracts are both effective coordinational methods, and the revenue sharing contract is more effective than cost allocation contract in boosting profit.