Clamp Problems In Collaborative R & D Research

R&D has always been a very important social activity. It is an important way for enterprises to enforce their competitive capability and the essential dynamic behind the development of national economics. More and more enterprises seek R&D collaboration with other companies or research organizations, in purpose of share risk and benefits. The cooperators invest specific capital in cooperative R&D, but because of the difficulty to change use, specific capital has a possibility to be held-up. When the investor anticipates that he can't get whole return from his specific investment, he will not invest efficiently. That is the holdup problem.In this article"Property Rights Theory","Reputation Theory","Contract Theory"and"Game Theory"is employed to discuss hold-up problems in cooperative R&D. The article analyses the causation and the mechanism of the hold-up problems from the angle of asset specificity, incompleteness of contract and opportunism. Then this article analyses various type of hold-up problems in cooperative R&D by game theory. At the ending, it gives some useful measures and advice to solve hold-up problems in cooperative R&D, such as redistributing property rights, designing contract, reputation mechanism, cooperation constructing, etc. This article has set up a research model of academic and practice sense.