The Research And Solution On The "Hold-up" Problem In Marketing Cooperative From The View Of Incomplete Contract.

Since reforming and opening, China has carried out a series of reforms including the improvement of the laws and the invonation of rural economic system and so on. The Markrting Cooperatives which start from the late 20th century is the important achievement by promoting rural economic development continually in China. In the initial stage, as an organization to unite the famer and rural enterprise, it has played a significal role to improve the productivity of the country. With the development of the rural economic and the deepening research on it at home and abroad, the system deficiencies of the cooperative has gradually entered the vision of the researchers. The"Hold–Up"problem in this paper is just a one of deficiencises in the system. At first, this paper had a overview of the precious study of this issure and discoveryed that there are some result on"Hold-Up"problem, but it also has some shortage, mainly represent on: a lack of the empirical research methods on this study, a lack of the suggestion of how to solve this problem. On this basis, this article began the analysis and resolves on the"Hold-Up"problem in Marketing Cooperatives.This paper give a priority to theorical analysis and focus on the logic of language, use the Methods of Contracts and Game Theory and introduce three variables V (co-Profit), K f(exclusive of investment costs), S (governance structure), reaching the following conclusion: If the investor's expected income is greater than or equal to zero, then the co-operative governance exsite the effective range which the two side can change to maximize the benefits. But there is two shortages, one is that the range exists only the investors'expect income is greater than zero case, the other is the two can not be arbitrary to expand the range of effective governance, or else would make the rights of farmers small and get a contrary result as the original conceiving. Actually, if the investor's expected income is less than zero, investors and speculators will be caught in prisoner's dilemma, strategy (Not investment, Speculation) is their ultimate choice. But for both sides, the strategy (Investment, Non-investment) is their best strategy. So the paper using the Reputation Theory to build model to draw the below conclusion: In an unknown period, if a speculator develop their own reputation, the performance will be "good guys", as investors will invest. And because both game period is unknown, speculators will not easily express the nature of opportunism, because once exposed to its own type, it will lead to investors in the next issue of retaliation. It demonstrate that the reputation as an implicit encouragement to push them get the optimal result.On the basis of the implicit of the Repulation, this paper argues Marketing Cooperatives should strengthen their reputation management and gives suggestions on three points such as the body of itself in economic system, the government and the public for reference.