Product Consumption Stage Of Green Trade Barriers In The Explanation Of The Reasons

As the existing researches mainly focus on the emission standards in the production stage with the monopoly model, this dissertation aims to generalize and compare the current basic theoretical models as well as its extended models, simply depicting the cornerstone and framework of the current theories.The current researchers hold that the original motives of environmental policies stem from the purpose of rising industrial competitiveness. However, it is obviously run counter to the Assumption of "Economic Man". With the influence of imperfect information, the governments observe the real pollutions which are quite different from what the consumers do, because the individuals could rarely be informed of the aggregate pollutions of the whole society. Based on the above-mentioned prerequisites, the governments are encouraged to issue the fraud pollution information for it's owns interests.On the base of the current definition of SOS(Strategically Optimal emission Standard) , this dissertation put forward the definition of optimally government-interest-oriented emission standard. This dissertation ,in the premise of consumption of self-interest government and imperfect information, has formulated theoretical models to depict optimally government -interest-oriented emission standard and optimally individuais-interest-oriented emission standard ,in order to interpret the reason: why governments of developed countries choose environmental policy ,which confine to the one used in consumption stage.These models are characterized with following features. Equal government revenue in two different stages means the return function of government in developed country; indirect utility function has been used because existing conclusion reliance of formality of utility function. In the first stage, exogenous tariff rate and corporate income tax rate determine the immediate revenue of government in rich country. In the second stage, government (one in developed country, or those both in developed and developing countries) would issue fresh pollutant information .According to it., consumers determine their own optimal emission standard in the prerequisite of maxim of individual utility.Firstly, this model, with reference of optimal tax system theory , is used to analyze the unilaterally issued pollutant information by a developed country under the assumption of self-interest government and imperfect information .This dissertation yields that determination of Optimally government-interest-oriented Emission Standard possibly have to do with such factors as price elasticity of demand, publicity of pollution , tax rate of domestic enterprises of developed countries and tariff rateSecondly, this mode is used to analyze determination of optimally government -interest -oriented Emission Standard, which is issued by both developed country and developing country. This dissertation reveals level of optimally government-interest-oriented Emission Standard could hardly be impacted by trust shared by consumers for the pollutant informationThirdly, this dissertation verifies in partial the results of the theoretical analysis, empirical examination focus on the statistics of export quantities of color TV, from China to U.K., Germany, and France as well as to European Union, and on that of export quantities and export volume of honey, tea and corn, from China to Japan . The result suggest, in short term, the EMC directives of EU contributed quantity restraint effect on the China 'TV export, and that also in short run, Japan related green trade barrier had server restraint effect on the low-elasticity products, say produce. To address this issue, this dissertation has proposed the response policy suggestion.