Study On Coordination And Cooperation Of Supply Chain Under Vendor Management Inventory

With economic development, the market competition is becoming fiercer and fiercer. And the competition among enterprises is more or less on supply chain. In a supply chain, all parties must discard the self-governed inventory management mode and adopt the integrated mode to restrain the demand distortion and bullwhip effect. Under this circumstance the Vender Management Inventory (VMI) mode has emerged. However, VMI could not eliminate double marginal effect and maximize the profit of supply chain. And the supplier will pay the costs for all unmarketable goods. Therefore, we should use contracts to restrict all parties and coordinate the supply chain.Under different situations such as 'stochastic demand influenced by sales promotion', 'stackelberg mode leading by supplier or retailer' and 'supplier as a risk-aversion partner', this dissertation studies the coordination and cooperation of the supply chain with VMI mode. This dissertation analyzes the decision making and profit of each party and provides related contracts to coordinate the supply chain. At the same time, this dissertation analyzes the realistic meanings and feasibility of the contracts and it will guide the enterprise to implement VMI mode.As to the situation of 'stochastic demand influenced by sales promotion', this dissertation focuses on different demand types (additive demand and multiplied demand) and different gaming modes (stackelberg modes leading by supplier or retailer), and provides a mode of the supply chain which consists of a supplier and a retailer. At the same time, the supply chain adopts the revenue sharing contracts and VMI mode. Then the dissertation compares the decision making of all parties in different situations such as centralized supply chain and divisionalized SC. From the comparison it can be found that common revenue sharing contract can not coordinate this supply chain, and the positivity of each party at this time is not as strong as positivity of centralized SC. So do the level of each party's profit. And there is a disconnection between inventory decision and sales promotion decision. Then the dissertation provides two new contracts (revenue sharing contract based on credit sales and unmarketable goods sharing contract), which can improve the positivity of each party to coordinate the Supply Chain. Then the dissertation studies the feasibility of newly designed contracts and finds the condition in which all parties will accept the contracts.As to the special SC with risk-aversion supplier, this dissertation provides a mode of the supply chain which consists of a supplier and a retailer, and uses the downside risk to indicate the risk of the supplier. Then this dissertation compares decision making of supplier in different situations such as risk-aversion and risk-neutral. The comparison reveals that the decision of risk-aversion supplier will be different from the decision of centralized SC, in other words, the inventory level of supplier is lower than inventory level of centralized SC. At the same time, the contracts which could coordinate the SC in risk-neutral situation such as 'the unsold goods compensating contract', 'stock encouraging contract' and 'amended revenue sharing contact', will not coordinate the SC any more. Based on the above analysis, a new contract is put forward to improve the inventory level of supplier to coordinate the SC.