| With the economic globalization development and technological progress,market environment is becoming increasingly complex,the competition between the traditional enterprises has not adapt to the enterprise development.To decrease the impact of demand uncertainty and satisfy the demand has become a main goal for many companies.However,in the supply chain operation of the respective businesses,these organizations have conflicting objectives,which often results in poor performance.Therefore supply chain management of the core idea for"cooperation,win—win,and integrated"and finding strategies to decrease the risk faced by the retailer are becoming very important.Supply chain contract has proved an efficient method for improving coordination among members of the supply chain.Revenue sharing contract,as one type of a supply chain contract,performs a unique role in coordinating the interests of parties involved.On the basis of some research results about the supply chain coordination,this research concentrates on the problem of supply chain with one supplier and one retailer under the demand uncertainty.The main contents of this research are as following:1)Study on revenue sharing contract mechanism in supply chain under risk averse。Revenue sharing contract mechanism of a two-level supply chain including two contract parameters namely the revenue sharing coefficient and the wholesale price with stockout and without stockout under random demand is built.The optimum of the retailer is discussed under two different type of mean-variance framework.On condition that both of the manufacture and the retailer can accept the profit sharing contract,the exact coordination mechanism is given.2)Study on revenue sharing contract mechanism in supply chain under non-cooperative decision setting.Profit sharing contract mechanism with a risk-neutral retailer and a risk-averse retailer under non-cooperative decision setting is discussed separately.With a pre-negotiated and determined profit sharing coefficient,the Stackelberg model of the manufacture as a leader and the retailer as a follower is established.And a unique equilibrium of the Stackelberg model is solved when the demand model satisfies the increasing generalized failure rate(IGFR)property.3)Study on revenue sharing contract mechanism in supply chain under cooperative decision setting.On condition that market demand satisfies the uniform distribution,the manufacturer and the retailer conduct the cooperative game theory in the context of the expected profit product maximization.The cooperative game model and Nash bargaining model are established when the retailer is risk-averse.And when the equilibrium of the cooperative game model and the Nash bargaining model exists,the supply chain profit result by using the cooperative contribution rate with the definition of Shapley and the result of the Nash bargaining model is compared.4)Study on revenue sharing contract mechanism in supply chain with a risk-averse manufacture and a risk-averse retailer.In a two-level supply chain with a risk-averse manufacture and a risk-averse retailer,by using mean-variance theory,profit sharing contract mechanism in centralized and decentralized setting under random demand is built respectively from angles of the supply chain,the retailer and the manufacturer,and the sufficient and necessary conditions of realizing supply chain coordination in centralized and decentralized setting are discussed separately. |
