The Empirical Research On Implementation Effect Of Independent Directors And Board Of Supervisors System Of The Listed Companies

From China Securities Regulatory Commission issued《the guidance about building independent director system in the listed companies》on August 16th, 2001,the listed companies in China began to introduce independent directors,which officially become a part of the listed company's corporate governance structure.While the company law gives the board of supervisors of listed companies the supervision right , the board of supervisors is responsible for the overall supervision of enterprise finance.The board of supervisors governance has become a hotspot issue of corporate governance research. The research purpose of the thesis is to explore whether the system of independent directors and the board of supervisors have expected effect in the listed companies of our country, whether the system design is reasonable and what the implementation effect is. The research method is normative analysis and empirical analysis, to ensure that the conclusions of the study are scientific and practical.Based on the theoretical basis of system of independent directors and supervisors, the thesis have the deep theoretical discussion of the design,nature and function of two kinds of system. The thesis also analyses the performance of supervisory function of independent directors and supervisors system in Chinese listed companies. Empirical study section quoted Shanghai A-share listed companies' data of 2007, finally chose 702 Shanghai A-share listed companies as a sample, established the multivariate linear regression model of implementation effect of independent directors and board of supervisors system to analyze the relation between the characteristics of independent directors and supervisors system and company performance. Company performance is measured with earnings per share and rate of return on common stockholders' equity.The proportion of the independent directors and the average reward of the independent directors represent the characteristics of independent directors system. The characteristics of board of supervisors are divided into four categories,which are independent characteristics,behavioral characteristics,incentive characteristics and structural characteristics. The variable of the independent characteristics is in the form of the proportion of external supervisors in the board of supervisors. The variable of the behavioral characteristics is in the form of the number of the meetings of the board of supervisors. The variable of the incentive characteristics are the proportion of shareholding supervisors in the board of supervisors and the average reward of the supervisors every year. The variable of the structural characteristics are the scale of the board of supervisors and the proportion of worker supervisors in the board of supervisors. The study found independent directors and board of supervisors system has certain effect on company performance, but the implementation effect is not ideal. There are still many problems and defects.Finally this paper analyzes causes of this result, combined with the reality of corporate governance in China, put forward the relevant countermeasures and suggestions that are suitable for China's national conditions: optimizing the equity structure,perfect the produce mechanism;optimizing the structure of board of supervisors;improve the incentive and restraint mechanism; make a clear division of functions of two systems, strengthen the supervision role by coordination of the two systems. Only in this way can we continuously improve the level of corporate governance, make the systems of independent directors and board of supervisors in China gradually get the ideal effect and play an important role.