Study On Incentive To Top-managers Of China's Listed Commercial Bank

Since the modern corporation with the feature of separation of ownership rights and control rights appeared, the inconsistent targets and asymmetric information between managers and owners of the corporation have come into being. To coordinate the potential the conflict of interest between managers and owners and decrease and prevent moral hazard of managers, it becomes the best choice to motivate managers efficiently. Top-managers are the important investors of the human capital elements in corporation, and their efforts and management abilities are the key factors driving corporation performance. Therefore, the incentive to top-managers becomes the keystone of incentives in corporation.Finance is the core of modern economy, and banking is the core of the financial system in China. With the end of the transition period of China's accession to the WTO and the further development of the financial globalization, a new age in which China's banks compete against foreign banks in all ways has begun. In order to improve the competitiveness, China's commercial banks accelerate the pace of the institutional reform. The modern system of corporation is being built in China's commercial banks. In the situation, the issue of the incentive to top-managers of the modern commercial banks has been put forward. Moreover, there have been many drawbacks in the aspect of the incentive to top-managers, for that reason, it seems more significant and urgent for China's commercial banks to build the efficient incentive mechanism of top-managers.In the thesis, the issue of the incentive to top-managers of China's listed commercial banks is studied by normative research, empirical research, qualitative analysis, and quantitative analysis. Firstly, on the basis of economics incentive theory and management incentive theory, the thesis studies the compensation mechanism, control mechanism, reputation mechanism, and market competition mechanism which play an incentive and constrained role for top-managers. Secondly, the thesis analyzes the present situation of the incentive to top-mangers of China's commercial banks, and sets forth the main problems existing in the incentive to top-managers of China's listed commercial banks; then, making use of data disclosed in the annals, the thesis tests the effectiveness of the compensation incentive to top-managers of the listed commercial banks, and evaluates the effect of the compensation incentive to top-managers according to the results of test. Finally, combined with the particularity of commercial banks, the thesis constructs a framework of the incentive and constraint to top-managers of China's listed commercial banks.