Studies On Allocation Mechanism Of Hydropower Resource In The Development Of Small Hydroelectric Stations In Zhejiang

Since the shortage of social resource supply,resource competition tends to become the main competing pattern among countries.Aiming at encouraging the development of regenerated energy such as small hydropower resource etc, Regenerated Energy Law,enacted in February 2005,causes a climax of the construction of small hydroelectric power stations.Corresponding with these,the selection of the allocation methods of water resource exploitation rights has gradually become one of the hottest research topics on property distribution.As one of the important attributes of water resources,hydropower resource's proprietary rights is possessed by local governments and its exploitation rights belong to the category of using rights.The distributing pattern of exploitation rights experiences an evolvement from free government allocation to paid market allocation.Zhejiang Province is the first to carry on the paid usage of exploitation rights of hydropower resource nationally.In practice,there are two paid transferring patterns of hydropower resource's exploitation rights,namely agreement transformation and public auction transformation.The agreement transformation is used in the occasion that there are little group competitors for the small hydropower resources.This pattern can reduce the cost.Its specific allocation method is similar to that of free government allocation,both are based on the optimality of system general interests.Its accomplishment requires the local government to get abundant information on midget water power stations' potential developers and the function of construction's potential loss.The auction transformation relies on market to allocate resources.So in the process of public quotation,bidders and tenderers can obtain other participants' information to facilitate making best decisions for largest benefits.In this dissertation,the author will use the auction theory,combining the practice situation of hydropower resources exploitation rights in Zhejiang Province, to analyze the auction procedure from the perspectives of both tenderees and tenderers.In order to accomplish the allocation through auction,the analysis demonstrates that the design of the best mechanism should make the following allocating and payment rules come true:1.Every potential explorer quotes the price,and the one who offers the highest price will get exploitation right finally.2.The price offered by the bidder who gets the exploitation right should just be higher than price from other potential explorers,including tenderees.In this article,through analyzing the recent allocation and payment rules of hydropower resources auction in Zhejiang Province,the author draws a conclusion that this auction mechanism is the best in theoretical analysis.Theoretically,the recent auction mechanism will facilitate tenderees' implement of maximum benefits,as well as help the bidders get the best quotation.However,in practice, the auction mechanism is not the same as it's expected.There are main two reasons: Firstly,the unsatisfied condition of theoretical analysis in practice results in differences between in theory and in practice;Secondly,there are still many weaknesses of the auction in practice,causing the impossible realization of optical allocation.As to hypothesizes proposed in theory,even some of them could not been proved in practice,they still can make the optical distribution result come true through changing methods from every part in practice.So finally,in this article, some relevant suggestions will be provided to solve problems in practice.