Reasearch On Supply Chain Revenue Sharing Contract Design Based On Stochastic Demand

Supply chain management performance of the core idea for "cooperation and win-win, integrated",which calls for the supply chain nodes between enterprises to establish a relationship of mutual cooperation.However,in the traditional supply chain operation of the respective businesses,these organizations have their own objectives,therefore,need to establish a coordinated mechanism for integrating enterprise nodes.As a supply chain contract effective solutions are more and more attention,supply chain revenue sharing contract is one of them. Revenue sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain the interests of all parties,so as to achieve the coordination of the supply chain.This paper under different conditions revenue sharing contract in-depth study on the issue of coordination,the following major elements:(1)On supply chain revenue sharing contract design under non-elastic demand.The revenue-sharing contract in supply chain contract coordination was studied in this paper.Supply chain revenue-sharing contract coordination model was built which considered the under-stocked loss and scrap value of surplus product related to its production cost,a newsvendor model was used to analyze respectively the behavior of supplier and retailer who were constrained by revenue-sharing contract,and the calculation of retailer's optimal behavior and the range of contract parameterφwere achievcd.(2)On supply chain revenue sharing contract design under price-sensitive demand.The revenue-sharing contract of supply chain coordination under price-sensitive demand was studied in this paper.At first,the revenue-sharing contract coordination model of supply chain was built when the end-consumer demand is price sensitive and the scrap value of the overplus product is related to its production cost.Then,the optimal decision of the retailer was suggested and the calculation formula of the range of contract parameterφis given after analyzing the decision behaviors of the supplier and the retailer respectively.(3)On supply chain revenue sharing contract design with retailer effort.In the assumption that the efforts of retailers bear the cost of their share of the proceeds under the premise of a proportional,a newsvendor model was used to analyze respectively the behavior of supplier and retailer who were constrained by revenue-sharing contract,and the calculation of retailer's optimal behavior and the range of contract parameterφwere achieved.(4)On supply chain revenue sharing contract design with downside-risk control.In this paper,a cooperation contract between a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer in a two stages supply chain model with downside-risk control was designed and modeled in order to study the influence of revenue sharing contract on the cooperation of supply chain partners.The restriction of downside-risk was satisfied and revenue of each other was increased.At the same time,when the supply chain revenue sharing contract was designed efficiently,the risk-neutral provided initiatively the risk-averse with necessary risk protecting to satisfy its restriction of risk.