Study On Supply Chain Revenue Sharing Contract Under Two Different Pricing Strategies

Supply chain contract is a solution to solve the problem of Double Marginalization and Bullwhip Effect, which is caused by interest conflict. It usually offers some encourage coordinating the relation of supply chain actors, which aims to balance the total profit and the central profit, or get the Pareto optimal solution.Firstly, we indicate the contents of supply chain contract and dynamic pricing at home and abroad. Then, we sum up and evaluate these existing researches in detail.Secondly, we study on a model of supply chain revenue sharing contract, under the condition that demand is random and retailer carries on static pricing. Based on the revenue-sharing mechanism and the symmetrical information, supply chain sells the only one kind of product and all the members in the supply chain are risk neutral decision-makers. In the revenue-sharing contract, upstream enterprises decide the whole-price, and downstream enterprises decide order quantity. The revenue-sharing ratio is exogenous variable, which is decided by the upstream and downstream enterprises together. When selling the product, the retailer carries on static pricing and the price is endogenous variable. The demand is random and settles for an iso-price-elastic demand model. This model allows the total revenue to be achieved as well as it can improve the profits of all the SC actors, by tuning the contract parameters, and the contract achieves the supply chain coordination. Besides, we propose the conditions that all the supply chain members satisfy with the contract, when comparing between the two conditions whether they use the revenue-sharing contract.Finally, the dissertation studies on a revenue-sharing contract model the dynamic pricing strategy in a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer. The model focuses on a selling period, the supply chain sells only one kind of product and retailer carries on dynamic pricing when selling the product. In the model, the manufacturer and the retailer are risk neural. The manufacturer decides the whole-price, and the retailer decides order quantity. The revenue-sharing ratio is exogenous variable, which is decided by the manufacturer and the retailer together. The retailer determines the quantity to be ordered from the manufacturer, prior to the selling season. In the selling period, we suppose that the stock of the initial selling period is equal to the order quantity. With the dynamic pricing strategy, the retailer divides the selling period into many steps and decides the price in different steps. It shows that, with the dynamic pricing and suitable contract parameters, the supply chain can get more profit than using static pricing strategy, and the revenue-sharing contract can also achieve supply chain coordination.