Research On The Principal-agent Risk In The Enterprise Pension Investment Of China

Enterprise pension act as the second pillar of endowment insurance system, it is a very important system in the social security in our country. Due to enterprise pension in our country implements complete accumulated fund, in order to effectively prevent future inflation unknown risks, protect the interests of the beneficiaries, so enterprise pension be faced with how to keep and increase value, and the invest efficiency of enterprise pension fund may decide the enterprise pension system works well or not. So the research on the investment of enterprise pension has great significance.Recently, the system of enterprise pension fund investment in our country ordain that the investment of enterprise fund must appoint enterprise pension fund assignee as client, enterprise pension fund investor, enterprise pension fund account administrant and enterprise pension fund account trustee as assignee, by means of principal-agent to invest. All of them as main actors of enterprise pension fund investment in our country.This paper discusses the principal-agent risk of enterprise pension fund investment in our country. First of all, base on the current pension fund investment enterprise system, analyze the principal-agent relation of the different model of pension fund management, and point out the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard bring by principal-agent. And base on the theory of principal-agent, point out the way to resolve that problem of in our country "hidden information" principal-agent risk (adverse selection) by screening model, and to resolve the "hidden action" principal-agent risk (moral hazard) by the moral hazard model. Finally, apocalypses of how to perfect the system of enterprise pension fund investment in China are given.