Research On The Principal-agent In The Enterprise Pension Investment Of China

Enterprise pension act as the second pillar of endowment insurance system in our country, it is a very important system in the social security. Due to enterprise pension in our country implements complete accumulated fund, so enterprise pension be faced with how to keep and increase value, and the invest efficiency of enterprise pension fund may decide the enterprise pension system works well or not. So the research on the investment of enterprise pension has great significance.Recently, the system of enterprise pension fund investment in china ordain that the investment of enterprise fund must appoint enterprise pension fund assignee as client, enterprise pension fund investor, enterprise pension fund account administrant and enterprise pension fund account trustee as assignee, by means of principal-agent to invest. This research commence with the system of enterprise pension fund investment in china, analyze the principal-agent relation, point out the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard bring by principal-agent. Base on the theory of principal-agent, bring forward screening model and moral hazard with hidden information model. At last, apocalypses of how to perfect the system of enterprise pension fund investment in china are given.