Price Discrimination Problems In Fuzzy Environments And Applications

This thesis studies a kind of price discrimination problems with incompleteinformation, where the agents'characteristics are their private information andcan not be obtained by the principal easily. As a result, it is unreasonableto use random variables to formulate the principal's assessment of the agents'characteristics.In this thesis, the principal's subjective evaluations of the agents'charac-teristics are considered as fuzzy variables, and then a fuzzy price discriminationmodel is proposed. In solving the model, ?rstly by analyzing the incentive com-patibility constraint, the participation constraint and the excepted welfare, thecrisp equivalent model of the fuzzy price discrimination model is established.Then the existence of the optimal solution is proved. Furthermore, the proposedmodel is converted into an optimal control problem and the necessary conditionsof the optimal solution are obtained by the Pontryagin maximum principle. Totestify the e?ectiveness, two examples are presented.Finally, the proposed model is applied to the labor selection and then anoptimal solution is obtained.