| With the development of the modern markets, oligopoly gradually has become the main market structure in whole-set equipment manufacturing. In the large-scale construction project of China, such as theThreeGorgeshydropower, the nuclear power station and the high-speed rail, a good trading mechanism is urgently needed to help enterprises and government to implement a procurement process of whole-set equipment. The dynamic Vickrey auction mechanism is an excellent solution for this question. The reasons are as follows:firstly enterprises begin to emphasize the long-term cooperative partnership with suppliers rather than minimizing the short-term purchasing cost;secondly government needs to pay more attention to fairness, justice, and effectiveness of the purchase order allocation in the whole procurement process; finally due to more transparent and openness than sealed auction, dynamic auction can be used to preserve private information of the winners more safely and make the bidders bid more intensely.Against the background of whole-set equipment trade in oligopoly market, this thesis focus on the equilibrium trends in long-term market competition and the dynamic Vickrey auction mechanism design in the short-term procurement.Concretely, the main works are as follows:First of all, the article introduces the background of the dynamic Vickrey reverse auction mechanism, and then proposes the research problems of this thesis based on overviewing the theory of Vickrey auction mechanism, primal-dual algorithm and multi-attribute procurement mechanism.Secondly, according to whole-set equipment trade in oligopoly market, releasing the hypothesis that the market demand is known, regarding purchaser as the player and using Cournot model, the articleanalyses the variation rules between the market demand and the market equilibrium, and get the equilibrium path in different alteration patterns of the demand, which could help monopoly purchaser plan long-term purchasing decision and lead the market trade to the good equilibrium path for the purchaser.Thirdly, the article designs a descending Vickrey reverse auction mechanism for the multi-unit allocation problem based on the clinching method of the Ausubel auction. The information is gradually collected, and the units aregradually allocated to be paid. It simulates a dynamic market transaction. The advantage of the information rent in elastic demand with respect to the rigid demandis compared.This mechanism implementsa VCG outcome. Truthful bidding is the ex-post perfect equilibrium. Finally, considering the multi-attribute procurement, we apply the Fenchel primal-dual algorithm to the multi-unit and multi-attribute allocation problem, and propose an iterative Vickrey reverse auction mechanism. The rules of the price changing are ascertained through analysing the sellers' and buyer's bidding. Meanwhile the Vickrey transfer payments whichstimulate the seller biddingtruthfullyare set by the dual prices. The mechanismimplements a VCG outcome and improves the market efficiency. |
