| Ensuring food security is the primary task of comprehensively promoting rural revitalization in China.Since the 1960 s,the impact of agricultural support policies(such as grain price support and agricultural subsidies)on the transfer rent of farmland and the scale of farmland management has been an international academic frontier issue.The small scale of farmland management hinders the establishment of a modern agricultural production system in China.In the past 20 years,the proportion of rapidly rising farmland transfer rents in agricultural production costs has increased significantly,which has become a key constraint on the moderate scale of grain management.Since 2004,on the basis of abolishing agricultural taxes and fees,China has established a grain price support policy system represented by minimum purchase prices,temporary purchase and storage prices,and target prices,and has gradually turned to producer subsidies.Theoretical and empirical studies based on European and American countries show that due to the lack of elasticity in the supply price of agricultural land,the policy dividends of food support prices and agricultural subsidies will be largely or even completely converted into farmland transfer rents,and agricultural subsidy policies are more efficient than food price support policies.It can significantly raise the rent of farmland circulation.This means that changing the grain price support policy to the producer subsidy policy will strengthen the capitalization effect of converting policy dividends into farmland transfer rents,which will be even more unfavorable for the moderate scale operation of grain.So,how will the grain price support policy and its shift to producer subsidies affect the cost of land and the scale of agricultural operations? This study firstly analyzes the mechanism by which food price support policies and producer subsidies affect land cost and agricultural management scale from a theoretical level,and then uses macro-level provincial statistical data and microlevel farmer tracking survey data to respectively conduct empirical research.This study consists of 9 chapters: Chapter 1 is an introduction,which explains the research background,the basis for selecting the topic,the purpose and significance of the research,and introduces the research method and the structure of the paper;Chapter 2 is a literature review,which sorts out agricultural support policies(including food support and agricultural subsidies)on the impact of land costs(farmland transfer rents)and the scale of agricultural operations,and point out the shortcomings of the existing research literature and possible innovations;Chapter 3 constructs “Food Price Support Policies— The theoretical analysis framework of “Land Cost-Agricultural Operation Scale”;Chapter 4 is the development and evolution of China’s grain price support policies;Chapters 5 to 8 are based on macrolevel provincial statistics and micro-level farmer tracking survey data.Empirically analyze the impact of grain price support policy and its shift to producer subsidy policy)on land cost(agricultural land transfer rent)and agricultural management scale;Chapter 9 is the main conclusions and policy recommendations.The main conclusions of this study are as follows: First,the grain price support policy significantly increases the farmland rental price and the willingness price of farmland to rent.If the food support price is doubled(compared to the state intervention price in 2004),the farmland rental price and farmland rental willingness price will increase by 174 yuan/mu and 190 yuan/mu respectively.The grain price support policy is the key factor to explain the change of farmland transfer rent.The explanatory contribution of the grain price support policy to the increase in farmland transfer rent from 2011 to 2015 is between 32%and 35%,and the explanation contribution to the decrease in the price of farmland rental and willingness to rent farmland from 2015 to 2018 is: 86% and 60%.Grain price support policies have obvious heterogeneity effects on farmland transfer rents in different regions.The grain price support policy can not only significantly increase the rental price of farmland in the production-market balance area and the main grain-producing areas,but also significantly increase the willingness to rent out the farmland in the main grain-producing areas.Second,the implementation of the market-oriented reform of purchase and storage will help reduce the cost of corn land.The impact of the market-oriented reform of purchase and storage on the cost of corn land has a lagging effect.Although the cancellation of the purchase and storage system can significantly reduce the cost of corn land,the implementation of corn producer subsidies has significantly increased the cost of corn land.Subsidized land rent will erode the policy effect of canceling the purchase and storage system.Third,the grain price support policy not only has a significant positive and direct impact on the scale of farmers’ agricultural operations,but also indirectly reduces the scale of farmers’ agricultural operations by raising the rent of farmland transfer in villages.Rising rents for farmland transfer in villages eroded the effect of expanding the scale of the policy by 21%.For the main grain-producing areas,large-scale farmers of 30 mu or more,and villages with more arable land resource endowments,the grain price support policy can indirectly reduce the agricultural operation scale of farmers by raising the rent of farmland transfer.Rising rents on farmland can erode the effect of expanding the scale of the policy by20% to 37%.Finally,the removal of the temporary storage system will reduce the corn acreage,while the implementation of producer subsidies will increase the corn acreage.In the first and second years of the reform of the purchase and storage system reform implemented,the corn sown area in Northeast China and Inner Mongolia decreased after the implementation of the market-oriented reform of corn purchase and storage.The cancellation of the temporary corn purchase and storage policy has a negative effect on the corn sown area,while the implementation of producer subsidies has a positive effect on the corn sown area.The above two policy effects cancel each other out.The cancellation of the temporary purchase and storage system will reduce the cost of corn land,thereby increasing the sown area of corn;the implementation of subsidies for corn producers will increase the cost of corn land,thereby reducing the sown area of corn.It can be seen that the subsidized land rent has eroded the scale-up effect of the cancellation of the temporary purchase and storage policy.The above conclusions have the following five policy implications: First,pay attention to the erosion of agricultural profits by subsidized land rent.The way of granting subsidies based on the actual sown area often strengthens the expectation of land operation income.Rural land contractors share part of the subsidy distributed to land leasing operators by increasing land transfer rent.Subsidized land rent has raised the cost of land leasing operators,thus causing problems such as land rent eroding profits.Second,the policy of "market pricing,price compensation separation" should be transformed into a target price policy based on the principle of production cost.We will implement the grain target price policy based on the production cost and set the target price at a lower level.Land leasing operators can determine the scale of agricultural land and the cost of land according to the grain target price announced in advance by the state.This will not only calm down the price risk of the grain market,but also avoid the rigid rise of the target price to drive up land costs.Third,we should seek a new subsidy way that is decoupled from land elements,and change the basis for granting subsidies to grain producers from land elements to grain sales.The subsidies to grain producers based on land elements have strengthened land values,which drives up the land costs.Taking grain sales volume as the basis for subsidy distribution can not only reduce the "gold content" of land elements,but also stimulate the intensive management of land leasing operators.It is also help to achieve the policy objectives of protecting the interests of grain producers and ensuring national food security.Fourth,we should strengthen policy coordination and adopt differentiated subsidies.We will combine grain price policies and agricultural subsidies with local government incentive policies to guide production.We should develop agriculture on an appropriate scale and give play to the guiding role of subsidies.Subsidies should be directed to major grain producing areas and large counties,regulate the grain planting structure,and accelerate the development of agricultural industrialization.Fifth,establish a risk compensation mechanism to reduce the risk of price fluctuations.Grain price support policy is unstable,and producers will face the risk of policy adjustment.Farmers are still facing hidden dangers of planting risks,so we should establish a risk compensation mechanism,explore the path of financial support for agricultural development,give play to the function of financial support for food production,protect the interests of producers,ensure food production security,and improve the competitiveness of food price support policies. |
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