| The economic consequences of equity pledges have always been one of the focuses of research in the practical and academic world.The controlling shareholder can not only lead the company's development strategy and business policy according to its voting rights,but also influence the company through its own financial behavior and inter-company relationship.Therefore,the academic research mainly studies the controlling shareholder's equity pledge behavior.The risk of equity pledge is closely related to the stock valuation,especially in the context of financial deleveraging liquidity tightens.When the stock market as a whole falls,the controlling shareholders of a large number of listed companies will face the risk of the pledge of shares being closed.Once the loss of control due to the forced liquidation of the pledged shares will not only cause significant uncertainty in the company's operations,but also will have a violent impact on the operation of the secondary market.It is very important for the regulatory authorities to smoothly and effectively resolve the risk of equity pledge.Otherwise,the cross-contagion of risks can easily lead to systemic risks and affect the stable operation of the market.How to identify the characteristics of listed companies that control the shareholding of controlling shareholders?Risks are also necessary to avoid blindly following the trend of investment,because the panic sentiment sold a large number of stocks to create a market "stepping on".The paper takes the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2009 to 2017 as a research sample to study the "independent impact" of shareholding pledge of controlling shareholders on stock price fluctuations.Considering the problem of sample selection bias,in addition to controlling the interference of other factors,in order to solve the endogenous problem caused by the systematic difference between listed companies with controlling shareholding pledge behavior,the paper uses the propensity score matching(PSM)model.By means of three matching methods,the listed company(processing group)with the controlling shareholder pledge behavior at the end of the year matches the corresponding control group sample(the listed company that does not have the controlling shareholder pledge behavior at the end of the year),from the qualitative(whether there is controlling shareholder equity pledge)and quantitative(controlling shareholding pledge ratio/shareholding ratio)from two perspectives to study the impact of controlling shareholder pledge behavior on stock price fluctuations,and further study the nature of the company's property rights,whether there are other shareholders'equity pledge behavior and multiple major shareholders of the ownership structure on this effect.The study found that:First,overall,even if the problem of sample selection bias is controlled,the controlling shareholder's equity pledge behavior will significantly increase the stock price fluctuation of listed companies in the current or next period,but from the perspective of the size and duration of the impact,the controlling shareholder equity pledge behavior mainly affects the current stock price fluctuations.Second,the nature of corporate property rights can regulate the impact of controlling shareholders' equity pledge behavior on stock price voiatility.State-owned shareholders are pledged due to "soft budget constraints" and government special"love".The behavior will not significantly increase the stock price fluctuations in the current period or in the next period.The pledge behavior of the non-state shareholders will aggravate the stock price fluctuations in the current period and the next period,but the impact on the stock price fluctuations will be less.Third,the equity pledge is not holding shareholders' exclusive rights,the paper further studies the controlling shareholder's equity pledge and other shareholders' equity pledge behavior to meet the"containment hypothesis" or "conspiracy hypothesis".The study finds that other shareholders' equity pledge behavior is based on the controlling shareholder's equity pledge.Further added in the current and next periods in the stock price volatility,investors not only need to pay attention to the risk of controlling shareholder pledge,but also pay attention to the risks caused by controlling shareholders and other shareholders pledge equity.Fourth,the shareholding structure of several major shareholders of listed companies can inhibit holding the shareholders' private interest behavior to a certain extent,the paper further distinguishes whether the listed company has multiple shareholder shareholding structure.The study finds that other major shareholders can significantly inhibit the controlling shareholder's private behavior.The shareholding structure of several major shareholders can significantly reduce the stock price fluctuation caused by the controlling shareholder's equity pledge in the current and next periods,providing empirical evidence for managing the controlling shareholder's equity pledge risk.The research of the paper futher enriches the research content of the economic consequences of equity pledge,discusses the impact of controlling shareholders'equity pledge on the capital market,and makes some attempts in the research on the relationship between controlling shareholders' equity pledge and other shareholders'equity pledge behavior.It provides a reference for investors to identify the controlling company's equity pledge risk,and also provides some reference for the supervision layer to prevent and resolve the equity pledge risk. |
PDF Full Text Request