Local Governance Innovations In Transfer Of Development Rights

The transfer of development rights(TDR)realize the change of land use through spatial replacement under the constraints of land use control and planning.It not only has an important contribution to land resource allocation efficiency,but also a significant adjustment to the pattern of interest distribution.Local governments are at the core of the state governance system,linking the institutional field and social field of TDR,and to a large extent dominate the specific designs and innovation directions of governance structure.Thus,it is of great practical significance to analyze the action logic of local governments in the innovation of TDR governance for improving the market-oriented reform of land elements and advancing the modernization of state governance systems.Although existing research has focused on the complex behaviors of local governments in TDR,a unified analysis system has not yet been formed to clarify the interaction relationships between local governments and other actors.Combined state governance theory with the characteristics of TDR,this thesis attempts to construct a closed-loop governance institutional analysis framework from the perspective of multi-agent interactions,which is used to depict the action logic of local governments in dealing with multiple complex relationships when innovating TDR governance.Under the guidance of this analytical framework,this thesis takes the incentive structure of local governments as the main line and conducts empirical research from four aspects: power allocation between the central-local,the driving mechanism of trans-regional trade among local governments,and the innovation actions and strategy evolution of local governments and social subjects(land property owners and market entities).In the research of central-local interaction,this thesis jumps out of the traditional thinking of holistic analysis.Following the theory of “controlling power” proposed by Zhou Xueguang,the controlling power of TDR is decomposed into goal setting,incentive provision and inspection.Based on the practice of TDR in China,this thesis summarizes the change paths of sub-powers and the authority patterns of governance modes,and further reveals the institutional factors for the realization and deviation of governance goals.It is concluded that the game between the central and the local over the controlling power of TDR essentially reflects the conflicts in the governance objectives.Their compatibility determines the degree of decentralization from the central to the local.Under the economic incentives of land for development,current overly rigid land management has instead encouraged local governments to take advantage of information to soften them from bottom to up.Thereby,the central government’s controlling powers over TDR are partially shifted.In the research on the peer relationship among local governments,Chongqing mode are selected as the empirical object.There are two incentive types —economic incentives and political incentives taking as the core variables to distinguish the institutional factors when local governments make buying and selling decisions.Moreover,heterogeneity of driven mechanism across regions is discussed.It is found that under different trading scenarios,local governments have differentiated rankings for these two types of incentives.In buying decision-making,they are mainly motivated by the economic incentives,and the horizontal relationship is characterized by competition and imitation.While in selling decision-making,they are more dominated by political incentives or political pressures,and there is a complementary effect in horizontal relationship.In terms of space,the decision-making mechanism of the main urban areas and their surroundings tends to be consistent,mainly stimulated by economic incentives.Nevertheless,the decision-making of the far urban areas is primarily driven by the political relations with other actors.In the social field research,this thesis targets into a more specific governance practice in Chongqing mode.Drawing on the relevant theories of institutional change in the Neo-institutional economics,this thesis illustrates how the local governments ally land-use enterprises and land property rights owners to innovate governance structure of TDR.It is showed that local governments,especially district and county governments,can easily rely on the advantages of information and policy resources to coerce relevant stakeholders into innovative actions,thereby forming a primary action group of governance innovations.When it comes to designing scheme,local governments take into account the dual principles of legitimacy and efficiency,and take legitimacy as the primary premise.In external profit sharing,land-use enterprises and land property rights owners are oriented to economic benefits,and the degree of local governments’ concession in economy depends on whether they can be offset from political and social benefits.Finally,on the basis of these two cases,this thesis further analyzes the conditions for achieving a stable strategy between local governments,land property rights owners and land-use enterprises,and how key variables impact on their game systems.Through numerical simulation,it is demonstrated that local governments and land-use enterprises not only compete for external profits,but also form an interdependent interest community.In the innovative actions with land property rights owners,administrative pressure exerted by local governments is a key variable to achieve system stability.On the one hand,it increases the cost of land property rights owners to choose non-participation strategy.On the one hand,it directly increases the negotiation cost and political risk of the local governments.Affected by decreasing political performance,innovative actions may gradually disappear with the normalization of collective commercial construction land entry into the market reform.