A Study On The Manifestation Of Rural Collective Land Appreciation Income And Its Governance In Asset Stock Cooperative

As an important part of rural collective property rights system reform,the reform of rural collective asset stock cooperative system has gained widespread concern.In order to solve issues caused by the manifestation of land appreciation income,central and local governments have actively promoted the reform of rural collective asset stock cooperative system.Correspondingly,rural collective asset stock cooperative has become a typical form of a new rural collective economic organization.The importance of the following question has gradually become prominent in the reform process:how we understand the manifestation of rural collective land appreciation from the level of the national system?After the establishment of rural collective asset stock cooperatives,how its governance structure and governance mechanism can meet the need for governance performance improvement becomes crucial.However,only few current studies focus on the governance structure of the cooperative.In reality,the reform of rural collective asset stock cooperatives was facilitated by the government,and thus there exists the phenomenon of governance of remaining village cadres for governance.How does the government intervention affect the governance of rural collective-asset cooperatives?What is the relationship between the intervention intensity and governance performance?Why is there a general phenomenon of village cadre governance?These research questions remain to be answered.In order to answer above questions,this study first summarizes the distribution and governance characteristics of collective assets in the process of manifesting the gains from land appreciation of rural collective land in China.With a focus on the governance of village-level collective asset,this paper analyzes the governance model of rural collective asset stock cooperatives,which is widely promoted,and summarizes its main governance characteristics.Results show that the structure and types of rural collective assets have undergone significant changes,especially in the developed eastern regions.The increase in the types of collective operating assets is mainly manifested in the decrease in the amount of land resource owned by the village collectives and is replaced by a large number of property assets such as factory buildings,working buildings,and operating assets such as village-run enterprises.To maintain and increase the value of rural collective assets and protect the individual property rights of villagers,the country began to reform the rural collective property rights system through rural collective asset stock cooperatives.The government participated in the reform and played different roles at different stages,while the village two committees(the village community and the village party branch)are always the governing body of land appreciation income.This study additionally analyzes the process of rural collective asset accumulation at national policy level.It is a dynamic evolution process involving multiple subjects such as the state,collectives,and farmers.Therefore,this study starts from the individual cognition,and constructs a dynamic evolution analysis framework from individual cognition to external rules to analyze the process of land revenue sharing system according to the logic of "Institutional arrangement,Economic behavior,and Behavior effect".This study depicts the facts of institutional changes in the manifestation of rural land appreciation,and analyzes the changes in the demand of the state,collectives,farmers and other stakeholders during different periods.Further,this study focuses on how the collective obtains benefits and what forms of collective assets are formed.The research results show that:ⅰ)The individual cognition of the collective and the villagers formed the starting point of institutional change.Influenced by the external environment,farmers have formed "internal rules" to maximize their own interests.The government selectively intervened in this process.As a result,the interaction between external rules and internal rules has led to institutional changes.ⅱ)Institutional changes are determined by both internal and external rules.ⅲ)Overall,the proportion of income of rural land appreciation shared by farmers has increased.Meanwhile,the source of collective income has become more diversified.Collective agents can participate in income sharing as landowners and can also obtain income by providing operational services.ⅳ)The results imply that future institutional changes require changes in the external environment as an opportunity to stimulate the expression of individual cognition.Without threatening the urban land market and guaranteeing the government’s interests,it is important to promote the government gradually to decentralize their powers and transfer more profits to the village community.This distribution of gains from appreciation of collective land will evolve in the direction of improving collective and peasant rights and increasing their benefits.This study also analyzes the governance structure of rural collective asset stock cooperatives at the organizational governance level in accordance with the logic of"Organizational model,Governance structure,and Governance performance".An analysis of the governance mechanism of the rural collective asset stock cooperative can enable us to understand with the existing governance structure whether we can achieve the dual goals of developing the village-level collective economy and protecting the property rights of farmers.The rural collective asset stock cooperatives can be treated as the result of the interaction between the state construction and social development.Based on this,this study splits the mechanism of its governance structure into two aspects.On the one hand,we define the boundary of government intervention in cooperative governance from the perspective of state construction.Theoretically,we establish a model of the relationship between the intensity of government intervention and the performance of rural collective asset stock cooperatives.Using the cases of Suzhou High-tech Zone and Nanhai District of Foshan,we conduct a comparative analysis.From the perspective of government intervention,this study analyzes the current situation of the governance of rural collective asset stock cooperatives and the internal logic of government intervention in the governance of rural collective asset stock cooperatives.On the other hand,we discuss the determinants and effects of the governance structure of rural collective asset stock cooperatives from the perspective of social development.Starting with the phenomenon of village cadres governance and taking Shishan Street in Suzhou High-tech Zone as an example,this study analyzes the possible impact of village cadre governance on the governance structure of rural collective asset stock cooperatives and discusses the development direction of its governance structure in the future.The main results are as follow:ⅰ)The intervention of government in the initial stage of the establishment of rural collective asset stock cooperatives promotes the achievement of a win-win situation for the efficiency and equity;ⅱ)With the continuous improvement in the degree and intensity of government intervention,the government gradually gets involved in the internal affairs of the cooperatives.Then,the cooperatives may rely more on the government administrative system,which not only weakens the economic efficiency of the cooperatives but also increases the burden on the government.ⅲ)The current situation of village cadres participating in the internal governance of rural collective asset stock cooperatives is formed under the dual effects of path dependence and government intervention.This model will lead to an administrative tendency in the development of cooperatives,and the phenomenon of low participation of internal shareholders.Thus,the economic function of the cooperative is weakened.ⅳ)Because the social function cannot be separated,the market scale is too small,the shareholder’s property rights are incomplete,the development model is single,and the incentive mechanism is insufficient,rural collective asset stock cooperatives still need to continue the internal governance structure.It is difficult to transfer to further transition to a governance structure that strengthens economic functions.ⅴ)In the innovative practice of the rural collective asset stock cooperative model,the government should change its intervention methods to assign collective asset management rights to professionals,increasing the ability of joint-stock cooperatives to operate independently and reducing the financial burden of the government.Finally,combing above results,two overall conclusions can be drawn:ⅰ)It is possible to solve the social contradictions caused by the increased value-added benefits of rural collective land through the establishment of the governance structure of rural collective asset stock cooperatives.ⅱ)The governance structure of rural collective asset stock cooperatives can be divided into two levels:government intervention and the internal governance structure of the cooperative.Based on this,this study believes that by improving the governance structure of rural collective asset stock cooperatives,the dual policy goals of promoting village-level collective economic development and protecting farmers’ property rights can be achieved.Specifically,in practice,the governance structure and mechanism of rural collective asset stock cooperatives can be improved through the following paths:ⅰ)The intervention of the government’ in the governance of rural collective asset stock cooperatives should be changed from government-led to governmentparticipated.Government provides training and establishing fault tolerance mechanisms,and establishing organizational coexistence mechanisms.ⅱ)In order to improve the internal governance structure,it is necessary to select the appropriate operating managers,use the"three governances" integration and thus enhance internal incentives.