Research On Co-opetition Strategies For Supply Chain Firms Impacted By The Government Subsidy Under Innovation-Driven

Innovation is the first driving force leading the development of firms.Especially,innovation is necessary for the domestic manufacturer to stand out in the fierce market competition due to their late start.At the beginning of development,domestic manufacturers usually rely on introducing technology from foreign manufacturers(licensing co-opetition)or purchasing core components(wholesale co-opetition)for product innovation.However,the overhigh dependence on foreign technology will put domestic manufacturers at a disadvantage in the competition.Therefore,domestic manufacturers are also trying to save costs through independent research and development(R&D)or purchasing core products from non-competitive domestic suppliers.In addition,domestic government subsidies are significant in alleviating the financial pressure on domestic manufacturers and suppliers to innovate.Therefore,under the framework of a competitive supply chain composed of domestic and foreign manufacturers,this thesis explores how domestic manufacturers can gradually get rid of the strategy of over-dependence on foreign manufacturers through independent research and development or turning to domestic suppliers and studies the impact of government’s subsidies on the innovation strategy of domestic manufacturers and suppliers.It provides a basis for building an independent and controllable innovative product supply chain.The details are as follows:Firstly,we study domestic manufacturer co-opetition strategy choices.Considering a management system composed of government,foreign and domestic manufacturer,domestic manufacturer completely relies on introducing technology or purchasing core components from a competitive foreign manufacturer for product R&D.The unfairness of bargaining power will seriously compress the profit space of the domestic manufacturer.This thesis constructs a co-opetition game model with government subsidies and analyzes the impact of competition intensity and bargaining power of the foreign manufacturer on domestic and foreign manufacturers.It is found that when the government does not subsidize the domestic manufacturer,the domestic manufacturer will choose licensing co-opetition under certain conditions;in the case of government subsidies,wholesale co-opetition is the best strategy for the domestic manufacturer.On the other hand,no matter which co-opetition mode the domestic manufacturer chooses,the government will permanently subsidize the domestic manufacturer under certain conditions.Secondly,this thesis discusses the choice of the domestic manufacturer’s independent R&D and technology introduction strategies.In order to alleviate the pressure of financial constraints on the domestic manufacturer,the government makes strategic choices based on the opportunity cost of subsidies."We construct a game model of competition and licensing co-opetition under government subsidies,point out the conditions for government subsidies to the domestic manufacturer,and analyze the strategic preference,independent R&D or imported technology,of consumers,the foreign manufacturer and the government.The research shows that government subsidies arouse the motivation of independent R&D of the domestic manufacturer.Interestingly,with the increase in the opportunity cost of government subsidies,the government turns from not subsidizing the domestic manufacturer to subsidizing it under certain conditions.Therefore,regardless of whether the government subsidizes the domestic manufacturer to carry out independent R&D,when the domestic manufacturer introduces technology,the government and supply chain members will achieve win-win results under certain conditions.Finally,the procurement strategy selection of the domestic manufacturer is investigated.The supply chain system includes the government,the domestic manufacturer,the foreign manufacturer,and the domestic supplier.The foreign manufacturer has cost advantages,while the domestic supplier has supply advantages.The domestic supplier decides whether to carry out technological innovation to reduce costs,and the government decides whether to subsidize the domestic supplier for technological innovation.Therefore,a game model of competition and wholesale coopetition is constructed.As a result,whether the domestic supplier is innovative in technology or not,when the product cost of the domestic supplier is high,the domestic manufacturer will procure the core components from the foreign manufacturer,even if the foreign manufacturer has supply uncertainty.When the government subsidizes the technological innovation of the domestic supplier,the domestic manufacturer always prefers to purchase from the domestic supplier under certain conditions.It is worth noting that when the domestic manufacturer procures core components from the foreign manufacturer,supply chain members and the government will achieve win-win results by enhancing supply stability of the foreign manufacturer.