Patent Operation And Supply Management Strategy Research Of Technology Supply Chains In The Presence Of Competition

The typical technology supply chain comprises technology suppliers,manufacturers,and consumers,and the key aspect that distinguishes it from the traditional supply chain is technology transfer.Innovation and technology selection,patent operation,and dependable supply are required to maintain the technology supply chain’s appropriate operation and create a sustainable competitive advantage.How to deal with the issues mentioned above and investigate the operation paradigm has always been a pressing practical issue in the high-tech industry.In light of this,it is of tremendous practical importance to investigate the patent operations and supply management strategies of businesses operating in competitive technology supply chains.The characteristics of the technology supply chain and market changes are combined in this dissertation,which also examines management choices regarding the operation of patents and the supply of technology in light of various competitive market structures.Since patent operation involves two stages of R&D cooperation and technology transaction,the patent acquisition and patent licensing strategy is investigated.Subsequently,supplier development and integration are analyzed in light of the manufacturer’s partial and total substitution perspectives for supply management.First,the influence of technology R&D capability and cross-licensing effect on innovation and corporate profitability is investigated under the three patent acquisition scenarios of manufacturers’ self-development,vertical in-licensing,and cross-licensing.The findings demonstrate that,despite the fact that in-licensing by a technologically advanced manufacturer hinders innovation,if its R&D capability is robust,it should opt to implement in-licensing rather than self-development.The two manufacturers choose self-development when the technologically advanced party has a low degree of licensing,and the technologically lagging party has a moderate degree of licensing if manufacturers trade between self-development and cross-licensing.The degree of licensing from the technologically advanced party to the backward party is the main factor to consider when manufacturers weigh the pros and cons of cross-licensing and in-licensing;the crosslicensing effect of both parties should only be taken into account in specific circumstances.Self-development or cross-licensing may be the best course of action given the shared desires of the two manufacturers,but in-licensing cannot.Second,two vertical patent licensing strategies based on the component or the product are investigated to determine the best patent licensing strategy and its effects on the competitive supply chain.According to the research,supply chain players’ preferences for licensing strategies are influenced by competition,disparities in production costs,and unit licensing prices.When a downstream supplier encounters an inefficient manufacturer,the component-based licensing strategy may be optimal,whereas the efficient manufacturer may adopt the product-based licensing strategy under specific conditions.Although technology suppliers’ product-based licensing approach may be the best,not all members can profit from it.Specifically,the strategy combination(i.e.,the technology supplier facing an inefficient downstream manufacturer supplying the component-based licensing strategy in conjunction with the other technology supplier facing an efficient downstream manufacturer offering the product-based licensing strategy)can accomplish a win-win situation for all members under a specific circumstance.Third,by using three strategic selection models—dependency on the manufacturer’s original supplier,supplier development by the manufacturer,and supplier development in the presence of upstream cross-licensing—to examine whether the manufacturer needs to develop an alternative supplier.The results reveal that the manufacturer is compelled to pick supplier development only when the manufacturer’s negotiating power relative to the original supplier is weak and the innovation disadvantage of the weak alternative supplier is not significant.Once the manufacturer chooses supplier development,due to the free-rider effect of cross-licensing,it will inhibit the original supplier’s innovation.Cross-licensing will encourage the substitute supplier to innovate if there is an alternative gap between the two suppliers’ capacities for technical innovation.When the manufacturer’s negotiating position with the original supplier is weak,the original supplier’s capability for innovation is limited,the alternative supplier has mediocre capabilities,the downstream manufacturer opts for supplier development,and suppliers are cross-licensed.However,in this scenario,cross-licensing only helps the manufacturer if it encourages the substitute supplier to innovate.Finally,the duopoly market consisting of competitive supply chains is constructed to study the strategic interaction of supplier integration and innovation investment and further combine the uncertainty of demand to examine the interaction mechanism of market risk,technological innovation,and supplier integration.The downstream manufacturer will continuously integrate with the inefficient supplier in a deterministic environment.However,if the efficient upstream supplier has apparent advantages,the downstream manufacturer will choose something other than integration.In an uncertain environment,the manufacturer chooses supplier integration if the innovation efficiency is moderate and the market risk is mild.With further reduced technological innovation efficiency,competition and risk are related to manufacturers’ strategy selection.Supplier integration becomes the best choice for both manufacturers if the market competition is moderate and the market risk is mild.In contrast,if the market competition is relatively fierce,it is beneficial for both manufacturers to conduct supplier integration only when the risk is relatively moderate.In general,this dissertation primarily makes the following contributions.(1)We broaden the research on patent acquisition beyond single horizontal or vertical examples to patent cross-licensing and vertical in-licensing;by creating patent acquisition strategy models of competitive manufacturers,we identify the equilibrium conditions under which cross-licensing becomes the optimal strategy.Cross-licensing has been proven to help businesses avoid too much competition.(2)To solve the component-based or productbased cost-saving patent licensing problem in chain-to-chain competition,strategy models for suppliers to license patents to manufacturers with heterogeneous costs are constructed.The equilibrium conditions for all members to achieve win-win situations are identified,and an important finding that an asymmetric equilibrium exists,which differs from previous studies,is obtained.(3)We creatively build models of a supplier development strategy based on supplier competition,expose the influence mechanisms of manufacturers’ supplier development and suppliers’ cross-licensing,characterize the equilibrium condition of channel win-win or conflict induced by supplier development strategy in the presence of upstream cross-licensing,and unearth the free-riding phenomena of innovation investment.(4)Supplier integration strategy models based on the heterogeneity of supplier innovation capability in the chain-to-chain competition are created,and the influence mechanism of supplier integration and supplier innovation is detailed.In addition,by extending the research from a certain to an uncertain environment,it is revealed that the manufacturer’s supplier integration strategy is dynamically influenced by market risks,innovation ability,and competition.