| This paper studies the influences of the management and control ability of the main manufacturer to the supplier,the collaboration attitude of the supplier,and the supervision environment of the internal and external supervision departments on the whole process of collaborative decision-making evolution,from the perspective of the problem-processing strategies of the main manufacturer and the supplier,under the "main manufacturer-supplier"(M-S)mode of complex product collaborative research and development(R&D).The evolutionary game analysis method is applied to study the problem-processing strategies with the considerations of differential payoffs,proposing mechanism,alternative suppliers,credit supervision,and "ability-attitudesupervision" related differences.The main research contents are as follows.(1)Evolutionary game analysis of problem-processing strategies evolution considering differential payoffs.In the newly established "M-S" collaborative system,the problem-processing abilities of the main manufacturer and the supplier are different.In addition,considering the factors such as the management and control ability of the main manufacturer to the supplier and the collaboration attitude of the supplier,the influences of their processing the problem on the improvement of the final product quality are different.Therefore,there exist differences in the incomes and cost risks of the stakeholders.We intend to analyze the strategy mechanism of processing unpredicted problem considering the differential payoffs in the new relationship between the main manufacturer and the supplier under "M-S" mode.The unpredicted problem refers to a kind of special problem that may affect the quality of the end product in the specific R&D process that is not considered in the contract process.If this kind of problem is not solved,it will cause systematic risk.Therefore,the main manufacturer and supplier must decide whether or not and how to deal with the unpredicted problem.In the meantime,they need to share the risks and benefits of dealing with the problem.The one who proposes the problem also needs to bear the risks of proposing the problem.With evolutionary game theory applied,research has been done on the influences of the initial state,the income impact coefficients,and the dealing cost on the strategic choices of the main manufacturer and the supplier(to deal with the problem and not to deal with the problem).We also explore the evolution process of the strategic choices of the main manufacturer and the supplier.The purpose is to provide managerial implications for both main manufacturers and suppliers,as well as to promote the effective collaboration and avoid unnecessary risks and wastes.(2)Evolutionary game analysis of problem-processing strategies evolution considering proposing mechanism.In the process of collaborative R&D of complex products such as large passenger aircraft,unpredicted problems are likely to arise.These problems are proposed by the R&D party(or parties)without any prior contract and the one who proposes these problems has to take the risk.We intend to analyze the influence of the problem proposing mechanism,considering the problem size,on the problem-processing decision-making processes of the main manufacturer and the supplier in a newly established “M-S” collaborative system.In our research of problemprocessing mechanism,in addition to the traditional cost and income factors,two factors are considered: the problem size(related to the income of problem processing)and the problem proposing mechanism(considering the opportunity cost of problem proposing and the possibilities of the main manufacturer and supplier to propose the problem).With the application of evolutionary game theory,we can obtain the equilibrium decision-making states of the two participants and the influences of these two factors on the problem-processing mechanism.Results show that when the capabilities of the main manufacturer and the supplier are imbalance,the problem size has little influence on the decision-makings of the two participants,while the problem-proposing mechanism does.This research helps the main manufacturer and the supplier consider how to take appropriate measures when unpredicted problems arise in a newly established collaborative system.(3)Evolutionary game analysis of problem-processing strategies evolution considering alternative suppliers.In the R&D of complex products,the main manufacturer will only select a single supplier for the supply of a part and establish a long-term cooperative partnership with it.With the development of material economy,the main manufacturer is no longer limited to the collaboration with its original supplier.Instead,there exists alternative supplier.We intend to analyze the strategy selection mechanism for alternative suppliers competing to collaborate with the main manufacturer under the “M-S” mode.The competition between alternative suppliers mainly focuses on the two problem-processing strategies as technology and price.They can choose to adjust the part to be sold to the main manufacturer to meet the main manufacturer’s overall design of the final product,or reduce the price to meet the cost conditions for the main manufacturer to change the overall design to fit the parts provided by the supplier.In order to gain the collaboration preference of the main manufacturer,two suppliers--the original supplier as the leader and the new supplier as the follower—making decisions between the two strategies one after another.We also consider the delay cost caused by the strategies changing,as well as the ratio of the risk that supplier and main manufacturer need to share.The evolutionary game theory is adopted to explore the evolution process of problem-processing strategies selection and competition between two alternative suppliers.Results can provide suggestions for the main manufacturers and the suppliers so as to promote the effective cooperation,and avoid unnecessary risks and waste.(4)Evolutionary game analysis of problem-processing strategies evolution considering credit supervision.In the process of collaboration in a supply chain,due to the differences in abilites and attitudes between stakeholders,there may exist slack in the process of collaborative problemprocessing.Supervisors are responsible for supervision on the problem-processing credit.We intend to analyze the effort levels of the supervisors in the supply chain management,manufacturer association and administrative supervision department,and manufacturer(considering both the suppliers and the main manufactures in the supply chain),based on two different problemprocessing strategy driven modes.In the supply chain management system,the construction of a complete credit supervision system can be generally divided into two driven modes: industry supervision and administrative supervision.Accordingly,we firstly establish the payoff functions for the supervisors and the manufacturer based on the traditional income function and marginal effort cost function,and analyze the strategic equilibriums of both players according to the decisionmaking roles of supervisors and manufacturer under the two modes.Then,we make comparative analyses of the equilibrium states in the construction of industry supervision and administrative supervision.Results show that the strategic equilibrium in the construction of administrative supervision is not necessarily better than that in the construction of industry supervision.Based on this result,the evolutionary game theory is applied to further analyze the decision-making evolution processes of the main manufacturer and supplier in terms of the problem-processing strategies on the selection of supervision modes under the "M-S" mode.These results can provide strategic help for the construction of credit system considering problem-processing mechanism in the collaborative R&D.(5)Evolutionary game analysis of problem-processing strategies evolution considering "ability-attitude-supervision" related differences.Due to the increasing emergence of new "M-S" collaboration relationships,there exist differences in the collaboration abilities and attitudes between stakeholders.The third-party supervisor is responsible for supervising the implementations of problem-processing strategies of both parties to assist the smooth progress of collaboration.We intend to do some research on the collaborative evolution mechanism regarding the problemprocessing strategies of the main manufacturer and the supplier considering the supervision function of the third party in the collaborative R&D of complex product.In the example of China’s large passenger aircraft,we establish the game framework for the main manufacturer,the supplier,and the supervisor as the third party,considering the characteristics of the collaboration with the main manufacturer(Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China,Ltd.)who is at its “initial stage”.This kind of main manufacturer is much more active than its suppliers during collaboration but is equipped with weak ability.We also analyze the possible strategies for each party and the related basic assumptions.Accordingly,we establish the dynamic system equations for the tripartite evolutionary game based on internal and external conditions encountered by the problem-processing stakeholders.Our explorations on the equilibrium points of the evolution process and their related characteristics can provide managerial implications for the collaborative R&D of complex product as China’s large passenger aircraft. |
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