Research On The Impact Of Mixed Ownership Reform Of State-owned Enterprises On Total Factor Productivit

The problem of low efficiency prevents state-owned enterprises from achieving highquality development,and the current reform of state-owned enterprises has pointed out the direction to make up for this deficiency.By introducing non-state-owned shareholders for mixed reform,state-owned enterprises can make up for the shortcomings of corporate governance such as “lack of owners” and “dominance of one share” and optimize the corporate governance mechanism.Thus filling the shortcomings of high-quality development and ultimately promoting the improvement of total factor productivity of enterprises.In order to make rational use of mixed reform to improve the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises,thesis studies the influence of mixed reform of state-owned enterprises on total factor productivity by combining theoretical analysis with empirical research.On the theoretical research level,thesis discusses the theoretical basis of the mixed reform of stateowned enterprises affecting the total factor survival rate.In addition,it explores the channels of the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises affecting the total factor productivity from three perspectives: executive compensation incentive,non-state-owned shareholders appointing executives and enterprise risk-taking.In the empirical analysis,based on the balanced panel data of 13835 enterprises of all listed state-owned enterprises from 2008 to 2021,thesis uses the high-dimensional fixed effect regression method to study the influence relationship between mixed reform of state-owned enterprises and total factor productivity.And through the analysis of action channel and mechanism,the influence mechanism of mixed reform on the total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises is revealed.The results show that:(1)The higher the degree of mixed reform of state-owned enterprises,the greater the improvement of total factor productivity.(2)The test results of intermediary effect show that the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises will improve the total factor productivity by improving the incentive mechanism of executive compensation,strengthening the appointment of executives by non-state-owned shareholders and improving the level of enterprise risk-taking.Among them,the intermediary effect of executive compensation incentive is 46.27%(monetary compensation for executives accounts for 33.99 equity compensation accounts for 12.28%),the intermediary effect of non-state-owned shareholders appointing executives is 29.43%,and the intermediary effect of enterprise risktaking is 13.87%.(3)The results of regulatory effect analysis show that the mixed reform is more significant for the state-owned enterprises that are still state-controlled,local and imported non-state-owned capital are private capital after mixed reform,and the state-owned enterprises that have a high degree of government intervention and have no political connection with the chairman and general manager after the issuance of the Guiding Opinions on Deepening the Reform of State-owned Enterprises in 2015.The conclusion of thesis is helpful to help stateowned enterprises make full use of mixed reform to effectively solve the inefficiency of stateowned enterprises,constantly improve the internal mechanism of enterprises and optimize corporate governance defects.Thus promoting the improvement of total factor productivity of state-owned enterprises and empowering them to develop with high quality,which has certain reference significance for the deepening of mixed reform of state-owned enterprises in China at present.