Impacts Of Tenure Security On Farmers’ Forestland Management Behavior And Income

Collective forestland is an important part of forestland in China.However,the productivity and forest stock level of collective forestland have been low for a long time.Most scholars think that the root of the problem lies in the void of active and appropriate management practices caused by the lack of economic incentives resulting from the failed tenure and governance system.According to modern property right theory,clear and safe tenure rights stimulate investment and promote economic growth through three ways:guarantee effect,realizable effect and collateral effect.Therefore,the collective forest tenure reforms(CFTR)with with “clear tenure right” as the core has become the key issue to improve the productivity of collective forest land.In 2003,the Chinese government launched a new round of collective forest right system reform,the essence of which is to stimulate farmers’ production and management behavior of forest land.In the early stage of the CFTR,positive policy effects were achieved,such as the increase of forestry investment and forest stock,the improvement of forestry production efficiency and the growth of farmers’ forestry income.However,with the advance of CFTR,there are some problems,such as the non-sustained increase of farmers’ forestry income,the fragmentation of forestland,and the low frequency of forestland transfer.How to stimulate farmers’ enthusiasm of forestland management is the key issue to improve the efficiency of forestland management and forestry income of farmers.It is also a practical problem to be solved in deepening the collective forest tenure reforms.Bringing the three dimensions of forestland tenure security into an integrated analysis framework can better understand the internal mechanism of the performance of collective forest tenure reform,more effectively formulate relevant supporting policies and guide farmers’ forest land management behavior.Firstly,based on the three-dimensional perspective of forestland tenure security,actual tenure security and perceived tenure security,and based on property right theory,farmers’ behavior theory and economies of scale theory,this paper constructs a theoretical analysis framework of “tenure security-farmers’ forestland management-forestland management income”.Then,on the basis of reviewing and summarizing the evolution of China’s collective forest tenure reforms since the reform and opening-up,using the data of500 rural households in the collective forest area of Jiangxi Province from 2010 to 2018,and using the descriptive statistics method,from the dynamic point of view of time,this paper analyzes the rural households’ management behavior and income of forestland under the background of CFTR.Finally,based on the data of 500 rural households and 50 villages in Jiangxi Province from 2017 to 2018,using Logit,Tobit and other econometric models,under the policy background of the “three rights division” of collective forest reform,in order to test the effects of the tenure security on the farmers’ forestland management,and the effects of the tenure security on the behavior the investment incentive and resource allocation,further study on the impact of property right security on farmers’ forestry income.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)After the CFTR,the total increase of forestland investment of farmers in Jiangxi province is slow,the willingness of farmers to transfer forestland and the proportion of participating in forestland transfer are low,the CFTR has played an important role in promoting the increase of farmers’ forestry income in a short time,but the effect is not lasting,and the proportion of forestry income is decreasing.(2)Forestland tenure security promotes farmers’ investment in forestland.In the aspect of actual tenure security,holding the forestland certificate has a positive incentive effect on the labor force and capital input.However,the logging quota system has no significant effect on the labor force and capital input of farmers.The possible reason is that farmers adopt the adjustment behavior of changing tree species and increasing planting under the forest to overcome the institutional constraints.In terms of perceived tenure security,farmers’ evaluation of property rights policy has a significant impact on investment.(3)Forestland tenure security will promote forestland transfer.Holding the forestland certificate enhances the safety expectation of farmers to recover the forestland,significantly promotes farmers’ forestland transfer out,but does not promote farmers’ forestland transfer in.The possible reason is that farmers’ forestland transfer in behavior is mainly affected by expected income.The logging quota system significantly inhibited farmers’ forestland transfer in and transfer out behavior.did not promote the transfer of farmers’ forestland,but significantly promoted forestland transfer.The logging quota system significantly restrains the behavior of farmers’ forestland transferring in and out.As for the security of property right,the cognition of the ownership of property right promotes farmers’ forestland transfer in and transfer out behavior.(4)Forestland tenure security mainly affects farmers’ forestland management income by affecting farmers’ forestland investment behavior and forestland transfer behavior.holding forest certificates not only directly affect farmers’ forestland management income,but also indirectly affect farmers’ forestland management income through intermediary variables(farmers’ forestland investment behavior).The the logging quota system will inhibit farmers’ forestland transfer behavior,and then reduce farmers’ forestland management income.The cognition of property rights ownership not only directly affects farmers’ forestland management income,but also indirectly affects farmers’ forestland management income through intermediary variables(farmers’ forest land investment and forestland transfer in behavior).