Research On Inter-provincial Supplementary Cultivated Land Transaction Mechanis

Cultivated land security is the foundation of food security.In order to ensure food security,China has been promoting the implementation of the policy of balance of farmland occupation and compensation for a long time.However,as the contradiction between urbanized land and cultivated land protection is becoming more and more acute,the problems of non-agricultural and non-food conversion of cultivated land are still outstanding,and the situation of cultivated land protection is still grim.With the liberalization of the "two-child" and "three-child" policy and the promotion of "new urbanization with people as the core",the limited constraints of land resources have become increasingly prominent.Urbanization and industrialization are the "two wings" of modernization.China’s national conditions of large population and small land and the process of modernization determine that the contradiction between land supply and demand will continue for a long time.In the process of promoting urbanization,the phenomenon of high-intensity land use in developed areas and the increasing abandonment of rural cultivated land coexist impressively.Obviously,the balance policy of cultivated land occupation and compensation limited in the province has bound the development of urbanization and industrialization to a certain extent,and it is urgent to break the boundaries of the province to expand the space for efficient land use.Breaking the provincial boundary of the balance policy of cultivated land occupation and compensation will not only help to improve the efficiency of land use,but also help to give full play to the complementary advantages of capital and resources in economically developed areas and resource-rich areas,and help to make a smooth transition from poverty alleviation to rural revitalization.The implementation of "Measures for the National Overall Management of Inter-provincial Supplementary Cultivated Land" is a pioneering attempt of the inter-provincial balance policy of cultivated land occupation and compensation in China.In the early stage of exploration,the inter-provincial supplementary cultivated land was managed by the state as a whole,but the administrative instruction price was easily influenced by subjective factors and deviated from the land’s due value.This paper attempts to establish the inter-provincial supplementary cultivated land trading mechanism and promote the marketization of inter-provincial supplementary cultivated land.In this paper,several key issues that may be involved in the construction of inter-provincial supplementary cultivated land trading mechanism are studied,including: the difficulties that may be faced by inter-provincial supplementary cultivated land,the experience that may be gained from the establishment of trading mechanism,and how to build the framework of trading mechanism.The following findings were obtained in the research:First,the inter-provincial supplementary cultivated land will face some inevitable difficulties.Such as widening the development gap between regions and deviating from the original intention of poverty alleviation;The increase of cultivated land in backward areas is accompanied by the loss of human capital,which may aggravate the phenomenon of abandoned cultivated land.The supply and demand of cultivated land that is inconsistent with the actual situation,etc.These dilemmas may be further highlighted under the national overall management mode of inter-provincial supplementary cultivated land.Secondly,from the evolution law of collective construction land transaction system and the characteristics of local transactions,it can be found that it is the general trend for the land market to break through the provincial boundaries.When building a unified national land market,excessive regulation or marketization can’t realize the good operation of the market.In the process of land transaction,we must have a long-term vision,do a good job in land use planning,and give full consideration to industrial integration and urban-rural integration,so that it is possible to use the funds obtained from land transaction to win opportunities for subsequent development.Public ownership of land,red line of cultivated land and farmers’ interests are the original intention and bottom line that must be adhered to in all land transactions.Third,because of the large transaction amount and relatively few transaction subjects,the land market is often monopolized.As a new market,the inter-provincial supplementary cultivated land trading market faces the situation of small cultivated land trading volume and weak competitiveness.The urgent need for development funds in backward areas may strengthen the monopoly position of buyers.Therefore,in the early stage of market establishment,the benchmark price of land must be set to avoid the low transaction price.By using the utility maximization analysis,this paper finds that when the benchmark price is equal to the price of land development right,the total revenue increases compared with that when the land consolidation cost is only compensated,while when the benchmark price is equal to the price of land development right plus the land consolidation cost,the added value of the total revenue is zero,and the change of revenue is only a shift between the two parties.In order to increase the total income,the benchmark price should be at least equal to the price of land development right.Fourthly,after the central government withdraws from the overall management of inter-provincial supplementary cultivated land,it mainly performs the supervisory function.Through game theory analysis,this paper finds that in order to make local governments comply with the requirements of protecting cultivated land,the difference between the central government’s reward and penalty should be greater than the cost of cultivated land management;The measure to prevent local governments from changing the land use without authorization is that the difference between the central government’s bonus and penalty should be greater than the income of land development right when changing the land use.Fifthly,agriculture is a typical risk industry.When taking risk into the pricing model of land development right,we need to consider its rationality,such as whether it is fair to the demand side of cultivated land.In the analysis of production risk,it is found that the method of measuring production risk by stripping trend output has certain limitations,while measuring agricultural production risk by technical efficiency not only has micro-theoretical basis,but also may make up for the loss caused by the loss of human capital to a certain extent.Sixthly,the coordinated development of "co-constructing parks" helps to make up for the economic development gap faced by inter-provincial supplementary cultivated land.In order to avoid the security system becoming a mere formality,it is necessary to establish a comprehensive evaluation index of coordinated development for assessment.The smaller the index value of the reverse index measured by theil index,the better the synergy effect.However,the decline of the index value is not necessarily the result of synergy,so it is not suitable as an assessment index of positive motivation,but a measure of reverse punishment.The innovation of this research lies in:First,institutional innovation.At present,the research on land market transaction mechanism mainly involves transaction pricing,market rules,transaction risk avoidance,etc.,but a complete transaction mechanism has not been established.Through in-depth analysis of the possible dilemma of cultivated land transaction,this paper compares and draws lessons from the institutional reform of collective construction land transaction and the differences of transaction practices in different regions,and summarizes and refines a relatively perfect structure framework of inter-provincial supplementary cultivated land transaction mechanism.Including: i.the transaction price mechanism obtained by maximizing utility analysis of the behaviors of both the supplier and the buyer;ii.In the case that the price deviates from the actual demand due to the overall planning of the government,it is suggested to implement the principle of market leading and government guiding;iii.In view of the widening gap of economic development and the outflow of population,the basic principles and guarantee mechanism of various transactions are put forward.In this paper,the construction of inter-provincial supplementary cultivated land transaction mechanism is not limited to the direct transaction of cultivated land itself,but strives to promote the benign interaction among government regulation,price mechanism and guarantee system to improve the inter-provincial supplementary cultivated land transaction mechanism.Second,theoretical innovation.Using the theory of supply and demand,this paper analyzes the government crowding-out effect,external effect change and its influence caused by inter-provincial supplementary cultivated land.Utilities maximization is used to analyze the behavior of both supply and demand sides,and it is concluded that land pricing should be based on compensation for land development rights.In the process of discussing the rationality of measuring agricultural production risk by technical efficiency,this paper tries to draw lessons from the derivation process of production expansion line and establish the micro-theoretical basis of measuring agricultural production risk by technical efficiency.Put forward the transaction guarantee mechanism of "co-constructing the park",including the construction of fixed-point granary project,collaborative development of human resources,etc.It is felt that Guangdong farmers’ participation in dividend distribution in the South China Sea stems from its superior geographical position,and combined with the innovative attempt of supplementing cultivated land across provinces to break through geographical restrictions,it is hoped that the backward areas can break through geographical boundaries by "co-constructing parks",and indirectly share the "spillover" of geographical advantages from parks,thus narrowing the economic development gap among provinces.Third,empirical innovation.Based on the pricing of land development right,the agricultural production risk is included in the model,and the rationality of measuring agricultural production risk by technical efficiency is analyzed.The panel space stochastic frontier model and the general stochastic frontier model are constructed for comparative analysis to improve the accuracy of technical efficiency estimation.Theil index divides the inter-provincial differences of per capita GDP in the coordinated development of "co-construction parks" into inter-provincial differences and intra-provincial differences,so as to better measure and compare the actual differences of per capita GDP among provinces.